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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Third District Juvenile Court, in and for Summit County,
State of Utah, to the Utah Court of Appeals, and is authorized pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a3(2)(c) (as amended 1990). The case is consolidated on appeal with a domestic action filed
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is
authorized pursuant to U.GA. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (as amended 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Appellee strongly disagrees with the Statement of the Issues as presented by
Defendant/Appellant in his opening brief. Defendant makes the statement that one issue
is: "[H]as Plaintiff caused the lower court to blatantly violate this Court's mandate?" Plaintiff
argues that such is not an issue in this case, because the lower court has made its decisions
independently after input from the parties. Plaintiffs conduct in persuading the lower court
judge as to the correctness of her position is not at issue in this matter.
The other claims by Defendant as to the Statement of the Issues constitute argument,
and Plaintiff vehemently disagrees that the standards to be involved in this Court's review
involve legal correctness as the Defendant argues.
Only one single issue is involved in this appeal: Did the trial judge, the Honorable
Olof A. Johansson, Third District Juvenile Court Judge meet the requirements of the Utah
Court of Appeals in its first decision in this case found at 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991)
filed December 9, 1991, by providing "more detailed findings" of fact justifying his
conclusions of law and judgment of termination of Defendant's parental rights?
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Since Defendant challenges the trial court's Findings of Fact, Defendant must show
that each challengedfindingof fact was clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the
evidence. The standard of review in this appeal is set out in State. In Interest of P.M., 790
P.2d 562, (Utah App. 1990), as follows:
The challenge to a factualfindingmust be conducted in two steps:
(1) Appellant must first marshal all the evidence that supports
the finding, and (2) then demonstrate to us that, despite this
evidence, thefindingis so lacking in support as to be "against the
clear weight of the evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous.
(Emphasis supplied).
790 P.2d at 567.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
U.C.A. § 78-3a-48(2) - set out in verbatim in Appendix 1. Although this statute
was repleaded effective July 1,1992, it was in full force and effect at the time of the trial of
this matter.
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a consolidated appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals from a determination by
the Third District Juvenile Court, Judge Olof A. Johansson presiding, that Defendant/Appellant's parental rights be terminated pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A. §
78-3a-48 (as amended 1985) and subsequent Utah Supreme Court and appellate court
decisions interpreting said statute. The Juvenile Court also ordered that a certified copy of
the Juvenile Court Order should be filed with the Third District Court in Case No. 873798DA, Kim Fazzio fWoodwardl v. Richard Cameron Fazzio. Said Order was filed on
December 3, 1990, and the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson entered an "Order FormaUy
Adopting Order of Third District Juvenile Court Terminating Parental Rights" on October
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26, 1990. Judge Wilkinson had previously entered a Minute Entry dated April 24, 1990,
declaring "the Order of the Juvenile Court on the termination of parental relationship shall
be filed in this case and shall be binding on the parties.11
The Utah Court of Appeals considered Defendant's original appeal in this matter in
Case No. 900626-CA filed December 9,1991,823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 19911 (Appendix 2).
In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded "for more detailed findings".
Despite Defendant's statement in his opening brief in this matter that the Court of
Appeals had reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to make
more detailed findings "[a]nd to redetermine the question of whether the father had
abandoned the child ...", the Court actually only reversed and remanded with instructions
to make more detailed findings. Although there is a hint in the decision that this Court "[i]s
not all together confident that the trial court's final decision was correct. . .", there is no
statement in the decision reversing the judgment in the case. In addition, there is no
statement in the decision suggesting that the lower court was required to "redetermine the
question of whether the father had abandoned the child ..." as stated by Defendant in his
opening brief. While Plaintiff concedes that the Court of Appeals was interested in having
the lower court review its decision, there was no mandate to reverse the judgment, and all
that was required of the trial judge by the Court of Appeals was that he make more detailed
Findings of Fact. 823 P.2d at 475, 479.
The trial judge responded to the Court of Appeals' mandate on June 15, 1992, by
entering his Amended Findings of Fact (Appendix 3). Defendant/Appellant alleges in this
appeal that despite the numerous additional Findings of Fact made by the trial judge, said
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Findings of Fact are still insufficient to meet the requirement of the Utah Court of Appeals
for more detailed findings. Plainti^/Appellee argues in this appeal that the Amended
Findings of Fact are indeed sufficient to provide a sound basis for the trial judge's
Conclusions of Law, which were not explicitly reversed by the Court of Appeals, and its
Judgment that Defendant had abandoned the minor child.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Kim Woodward (hereinafter Plaintiff) learned she was pregnant with the minor
child which is the subject of this action (hereafter R.A.F.) in February of 1986 (T. 95).
2. R.A.F. was born on September 17, 1986 (T. 19).
3. Plaintiff was married to Richard Cameron Fazzio (hereinafter Defendant) on
November 3, 1986 (T. 19), and their marriage was annulled by the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson in Civil No. D-87-3798 on November 19, 1987 (T. 19).
4. The Decree of Annulment provided, among other things:
(a) Plaintiff was awarded the custody of R.A.F. subject to reasonable visitation
rights in Defendant as agreed upon between the parties;
(b) Defendant was ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month
as and for child support until R.A.F. reached the age of majority;
(c)

Defendant was ordered to maintain his existing medical and dental

insurance for the benefit of R.A.F., and each party was ordered to assume and pay one-half
of any medical or dental costs of R.A.F. not covered by insurance;
(d) Plaintiff was entitled to claim R.A.F. as a dependent on her income tax
returns. (Appendix 4).
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5. Defendant admitted that he urged Plaintiff to get an abortion when he first learned
she was pregnant with R.A.F. (T. 585, 586).
6. Plaintiff testified that Defendant bragged to her that he had two former girlfriends
who had also had abortions. Plaintiff informed Defendant she beheved that abortion was
murder and there was an argument over the subject. Plaintiff testified that there was more
than one occasion when Defendant expressed a desire to have the child aborted (T. 20, 21).
7. The parties had numerous separations during the course of their brief one-year
marriage (T. 21).
8. Plaintiff had a child from a previous marriage, Christopher Holt (DOB: 2/13/83),
who lived with Plaintiff at the time she was married to Defendant.

Christopher was

approximately four years old during that period (T. 28).
9. Plaintiff testified that during the course of the marriage, she and her children
(including R.A.F.) were regularly subjected to mental and physical threats and abuse (T. 22,
23, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 151, 153, 154,
155, 158, 183, 184, 189, 190, 191).
10. Defendant admitted during the course of the marriage that he "smacked Kim" but
claimed that he never hit R.A.F. (T. 499). Defendant later admitted that on occasion he
"slapped Kim" and that he did not make sure that either R.A.F. or the child Christopher
were out of the room when he slapped her (T. 598).
11. Plaintiff testified that she talked Defendant into seeking marriage counseling
during the marriage; but that not only did his abuse of her not change, he actually beat her
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the day of the counseling because he didn't like the things she said to the counselor (T. 21,
22, 23).
12. Plaintiff testified that Defendant was never a parent to R.A.F. from the time he
was born. She testified he refused to babysit the child, even though he was not working
most of the time during their marriage. Plaintiff testified that Defendant played no part in
the care or nurturing of R.A.F. during the one-year marriage; he would not get up at night
with the child, he would not change a diaper, he would not feed a bottle (T. 23, 24, 25).
13. Mr. Holt testified that his son Christopher told him during his visitations that he
was terrified of Defendant, and that Defendant had threatened him (Christopher) with a
knife and hit him a number of times. Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him
Defendant at one point drove Plaintiff and Christopher out of Plaintiff's home with a gun
and told them that if they came back, he (Defendant) would kill them (T. 151,152,153,154,
155, 156, 157, 158). This testimony was corroborated by Plaintiff (See Fact No. 23 infra).
14. Mr. Holt testified that when he confronted Defendant about this abuse of his son
Christopher, Defendant responded !f[W]hile Christopher is in my house, I will treat him the
way I want" (T. 154, 155). This testimony was corroborated by Plaintiff who described
Defendant's attitude toward Christopher as "mean and hateful... cruel..." (T. 32).
15. When asked on cross-examination if, during these confrontations Mr. Holt had
with Defendant, Defendant admitted he was the father of R.A.F., Mr. Holt responded "[H]e
neither admitted he was his father nor denied it" (T. 161).
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16. Plaintiff testified that she discussed Darren Holt's problems with the State of
Utah as a result of Defendant's refusal to take responsibility for R.A.F., but Defendant still
refused to take such responsibility (T. 27).
17. Plaintiff testified that Defendant refused to take financial responsibility for R.A.F.
during the course of the marriage, and never gave her any money for the child in any way.
His refusal to help support R.A.F. resulted in the child being required to wear second-hand
items and lacking some of the necessities of life (T. 29, 30).
18. After the parties separated for the last time, Plaintiff testified she spoke to
Defendant many times about needing money and child support, and he refused to give her
anything whatsoever as child support (T. 30).
19. Plaintiff testified she never saw Defendant buy presents for the child during the
course of the marriage or afterwards (T. 30).
20. Plaintiff testified that Defendant did not love or nurture R.A.F. during the time
of the marriage in any way (T. 30).
21. The final separation of the parties came September 10, 1987, and on that date
Defendant drove Plaintiff and her child Christopher from the marital home at gunpoint and
took off with R.A.F. (T. 31, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55).
22. Plaintiff testified Defendant tried to commit suicide twice during the course of
their marriage (T. 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62).
23. Defendant admitted he tried to commit suicide on at least one occasion (T. 595,
596).
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24. Plaintiff testified that on one occasion, Defendant grabbed her by the hair and
had her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she started calling for
Christopher to run over to the neighbors and have them call the police. Plaintiff testified
that as soon as he moved, Defendant said lf[I]f anybody moves off that couch, 111 kill her".
Plaintiff testified that R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing this
physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Plaintiff testified that both R.A.F.
and Christopher were terrified and they were taken by the police to the YWCA after this
incident (T. 42, 43, 44).
25. After these incidents of abuse, Plaintiff testified that she retained a lawyer and
asked Defendant to accompany her to the lawyer's office to sign some papers, one provision
of which would require him to pay child support. Plaintiff testified that he became angry
and tore up the paper, although he later signed it (T. 63, 64, 65).
26. Plaintiff testified that she received absolutely no child support from Defendant
and that she tried constantly to locate him, but was unable to. She testified that even though
Defendant's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived at the same address during this
entire period of time, they would refuse to tell her Defendant's address so that she might
collect child support from him. She also testified that every time she saw Defendant, she
asked him for child support and he would always refuse to give it to her (T. 71, 72, 73, 74).
27. Plaintiff testified that although Defendant came around four or five times from
the date of their last separation in September of 1987 through September of 1988, he spent
very little time with R.A.F. She also testified that after September of 1988, he never came
to see the child at all, nor telephoned, nor contacted the child in any way (T. 75, 76,77,78).
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28. Although she allowed Defendant's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, to see
the child occasionally between September of 1988 and October of 1989, she gave
Defendant's parents a note telling them that if Defendant wanted to see R.A.F., it was up
to him to come and get him, and that she would allow Defendant's parents to see the child
when she returned from a vacation (T. 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81).
29. Plaintiff testified that after the visitations with Defendant's parents, she would
always ask R.A.F. if he had seen Defendant during the visitations, and R.A.F. would say "no"
(T. 82, 83).
30. Plaintiff testified that after she gave Defendant's parents the note in October of
1989, Defendant never contacted her requesting any visitation whatsoever prior to his filing
a Petition to Modify the Decree of Annulment (T. 84).
31. Plaintiff then sought the assistance of attorney Larry R. Keller and filed a
Verified Petition to Terminate Parental Relationship, Rights and Duties on January 23,1990.
32.

Commissioner Sandra Peuler issued a Minute Entry Recommendation on

February 7, 1990, later adopted by Judge Wilkinson, allowing visitation for Defendant only
at Defendant's parents' residence, and only when Defendant was in Salt Lake for one
weekend per month (see Appendix 5).
33. Defendant then exercised his visitation in 1990 in the months of March, May and
June. He failed to exercise his visitation in April, and Plaintiff testified that she received no
notice of a requested visitation in July. The Court had required in its Minute Entry of
February 7, 1990, that "Defendant is to provide one week's advance notice of his intent to
visit" (T. 131, 132 Appendix 5).
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34. Plaintiff testified that only after she filed this Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights, did she receive checks from Richard and Steffany Fazzio, supposedly on behalf of
Defendant, but her attorney advised her to return those checks (T. 133).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff understands the concerns of the Utah Court of Appeals in the initial appeal
of this matter, and the reasons for remand for more detailed Findings of Fact. Plaintiff
argues in this brief that the Honorable Olof A. Johansson's original Findings of Fact
(Appendix 6), as supplemented by his Amended Findings of Fact dated June 15, 1992
(Appendix 3), did indeed provide the necessary detail to support the original Conclusions
of Law and Judgment of the Court terminating Defendant's parental rights in this matter.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant cannot meet the burden of demonstrating that Judge
Johansson's original Findings and Conclusions, as supported by his Amended Findings and
Conclusions, are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of evidence, thus
making them clearly erroneous. Plaintiff submits that it would not have mattered what the
additional Findings of Fact made by Judge Johansson in response to the directive of the
Court of Appeals in the original appeal were, Defendant would not have been satisfied; and
would have argued they were insufficient. This is because he totally misunderstood the
directive of the Court of Appeals in its initial opinion regarding this matter.
Defendant mistakenly believes and argues to this Court in this second appeal that it
was the mandate of the Court of Appeals in itsfirstOpinion that the trial judge reverse his
Judgment terminating the parentalrightsof Defendant, and so nothing short of that result,
and Findings of Fact supporting that result, would have satisfied Defendant.
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Plaintiff submits that the mandate of the Utah Court of Appeals in the first appeal
was for the Court to make "more detailed Findings of Fact" to justify its Conclusions of Law
and Judgment in this matter. The Court of Appeals suggested that if the trial judge were
unable to make more detailed Findings of Fact supporting its Conclusions and Judgment,
then it should consider reversing its original decision. However, the Honorable Olof A.
Johansson was indeed able to make more detailed Findings of Fact responding to the
directive of the Utah Court of Appeals, and thus maintained his Conclusions of Law and
Judgment of termination of Defendant's parental rights as originally determined. It is
Plaintiff's position that this was a perfectly acceptable procedure pursuant to the Court of
Appeals first opinion in this case, and the trial judge has met all requirements necessary to
establish the fact that the Judgment should be affirmed by this Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT MISCONSTRUES AND MISUNDERSTANDS
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IN THE
ORIGINAL APPEAL OF THIS CASE.
Defendant, in his opening brief, has misconstrued and misunderstood the decision of
the Utah Court of Appeals in the original appeal of this matter entitled Woodward v.
Fazzio. Case No. 900626-CA, filed December 9, 1991, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991)
(Appendix 2).
Defendant argues in his "Statement of the Issues" in his opening brief that "[H]ad the
lower court followed the instructions regarding appropriate [sic] FINDING OF FACT, it
could not have come to the conclusion that the Father had abandoned his child
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" He

then incorrectly states the standard of review to be a "question of law, and is reviewed for
correctness with no deference to the lower Court's determination." (Defendant's Opening
Br. p. xi). Further he claims "[Tjhere is no basis in any of the Findings of Fact to suggest
that the Father destroyed the parent-child relationship. The standard of review is a question
of law, and is reviewed for correctness with no deference to the lower Court's determination.
..." (Defendant's Opening Br. p. x).
Plaintiff submits that Defendant has misstated and inaccurately presented the standard
of review in this matter. As stated in Defendant's "Statement of the Issues Presented for
Review" in this brief, the Utah Court of Appeals made the following statement regarding a
challenge to factualfindingsin a juvenile court proceeding on appeal in the case of State,
in Interest of P.M.. 790 P.2d 562 (Utah App. 1990) as follows:
The challenge to a factual finding must be conducted in two steps:
(1) Appellant mustfirstmartial all of the evidence that supports
the findings, and (2) then demonstrate to us that, despite this
evidence, thefindingis so lacking in support as to be "against the
clear weight of evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous. Doelle v.
Bradley. 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); In Re Estate of
BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989).
790 P.2d at 567.
The Utah Court of Appeals in the aforementioned case was quoting standards
established by the Utah Supreme Court in 1989 and applied to appeals from the Juvenile
Court. See State Ex. Rel. P.H. and M.H.. 783 P.2d 565 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
There can be no question that what happened in the first appeal, and what is clearly
happening in the second appeal by Defendant is that he is challenging the sufficiency of the
Findings of Fact of the lower court. This being the case, the standard for review is not legal
correctness as incorrectly stated by Defendant, but the "clearly erroneous" standard based
12

upon findings so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence.11 In
applying this standard, the Utah Court of Appeals must provide a presumption of
correctness to the Findings of Fact of the lower court. It seems clear, whether it be the
Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court, an appellate court in Utah will not
substitute its own Findings of Fact for those of the trial judge who heard the evidence
directly, observed the demeanor of the witnesses, and judged their credibility.
The Court of Appeals made this great appellate principle clear in the case of State
In Interest of P.H. and M.H. v. Harrison, 783 P.2d 565 (Utah App. 1989):
Moreover, we defer to the juvenile court because of its "advantaged position with respect to the parties and the witnesses." Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110,1112 (Utah 1977)... We must
accordingly "rely heavily on the presumption of correctness that
attends these findings". In re Estate of Bartell. 776 P.2d 885, 886
(Utah 1989).
783 P.2d at 570.
As Defendant argued on page 21 of his opening brief this matter, never has a case
more clearly demonstrated why it is essential for an appellate court to defer to the Juvenile
Court on Findings of Fact than the instant case. It is the position of Plaintiff that Defendant
stated numerous falsehoods and committed perjury during his testimony in the trial court.
This was demonstrated through cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses and evidence which
could not be overcome by Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiff maintains that the physical
manner in which the Defendant and his witnesses testified in this case was as important as
the words they used in determining their credibility. The trial judge alone was in a position
to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and his determination should not be disturbed by
this Court without a demonstration by Defendant that the Findings are against the clear
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weight of the evidence and thus clearly erroneous. State In Interest of P.H. and M.H. v.
Harrison, Id.
This Court must not allow Defendant to get away with misstating and mischaracterizing the standard of review in this case as he does in his opening brief on pages xi, x, and in
Argument No. One of his brief (pp. 1-5), Argument No. Three of his brief (pp. 12-42), and
his Conclusion (p. 49).
While counsel for Plaintiff respects an advocate who zealously represents his client's
interest, it is inappropriate and bordering on misconduct for Defendant's attorney to misstate
the standard of review on appeal of a Finding of Fact in a Juvenile Court matter. This is
particularly true where Plaintiffs attorney is accused of causing "the lower court to blatantly
violate (the Court of Appeals') mandate." (Defendant's Opening Br. Argument No. One pp.
1-5). Plaintiff submits that the only reasonable interpretation of the Court of Appeals'
decision is that the Court of Appeals was uncertain of the Conclusions of Law and Judgment
of the trial court based upon the then-existing Findings of Fact, and remanded the case for
"more detailed findings." Plaintiff would once again submit that if the Court of Appeals had
intended to reverse the judgment of the trial court, it could have done so. The Court of
Appeals could have compelled the trial judge to enter an order of judgment in favor of
Defendant, but it clearly did not do so! Despite having reservations based upon the thenexisting Findings of Fact made by the lower court in the original proceeding, the Court of
Appeals was suggesting that if more detailed Findings of Fact could be gleaned from the
record so as to support the Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the lower court, then the
Judgment may stand. However, if the lower court were unable to make the more detailed
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Findings of Fact necessary to support its Conclusions of Law and Judgment, then it should
reverse its decision.
Obviously, the Honorable Olof A. Johansson determined that his Conclusions of Law
and Judgment could be supported by more detailed Findings of Fact, and he did indeed
create an "Amended Findings of Fact1' to supplement his original Findings of Fact for that
purpose. Although the trial judge had the option of reversing his Conclusions of Law and
Judgment because the more detailed Findings of Fact required by the Utah Court of
Appeals were not available, Judge Johansson clearly rejected that approach and found that
the more detailed Findings of Fact as required by the Court of Appeals did exist; and he so
ruled by making his Amended Findings of Fact dated June 15, 1992 (Appendix 3).
Applying the correct standard of review, (which is providing Judge Johansson's
Findings with a "presumption of correctness" and requiring Defendant to meet the burden
of showing the Court that the Findings are "clearly erroneous, i.e.,... against the weight of
the evidence"), the Court should then turn to the next question, which is: Did Defendant
meet his burden?
POINT n
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
SUPPLEMENTING HIS ORIGINAL FINDINGS OF FACT IN
THIS MATTER ARE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT OF TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS IN THIS CASE,
As indicated in Point I of this brief, Plaintiff reads the Utah Court of Appeals'
decision in the first appeal as requesting the trial judge to determine if more detailed
Findings can be made to support his Conclusions of Law and Judgment; and if not, he
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should have reconsidered his original decision terminating Defendant's parental rights. The
Court of Appeals determined that more detailed Findings needed to be made by the trial
judge in paragraphs 7, 8, 10 and 11 of his original Findings of Fact in the above-entitled
matter. Woodward v. Fazzio. supra at 478.
The Court of Appeals noted in its Opinion on the first appeal in this matter
ff

[A]lthough the trial court's Findings of Fact constitute a full three pages of text, they

nonetheless provide an inadequate account of the actual facts supporting the Court's
decision.11 Woodward v. Fazzio, supra at 478. In responding to this critical observation by
the Court, the Honorable Olof A. Johansson entered a full eight additional pages of text
providing for no less than an additional 44 paragraphs finding separate facts in this case.
On sheer volume alone, it must be concluded that Judge Johansson clearly attempted to
meet the mandate of this Court by making more detailed Findings. Of course, the Court
is not so interested in the quantity of Finding of Facts determined by the lower court as it
is the quality of those facts, and we believe both Plaintiff and Judge Johansson understood
this when addressing the Amended Findings of Fact issue.
Defendant, in several places in his opening brief, seems to make much of the fact that
the lower court judge adopted, almost verbatim in many cases, the requested additional
Findings of Fact presented to him by PlaintifFs counsel. Interestingly enough, Defendant
points out that Judge Johansson gave each side the opportunity to propose additional
Findings of Fact to meet the requirements of the Court of Appeals in its Opinion in the first
appeal in this case. As Plaintiff understands Defendant's argument, because the lower court
judge decided to adopt many or most of the proposals made by PlaintifFs counsel, the judge
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was in error and Plaintiffs counsel should be somehow chastised for causing "the lower court
to blatantly violate (the Court of Appeals' mandate)." (Argument No. One Defendant's
Opening Br. p. 1). Obviously, Judge Johansson believed that the additional detailed Findings
of Fact submitted by Plaintiffs counsel were sufficient to meet the requirements of the Court
of Appeals and to allow him to conclude that his original Conclusions of Law and
Termination Order in this case were indeed justified by the facts. In fact, Defendant's
counsel literally insults Judge Johansson by making it appear that he did not use his own
best judgment in this case, but was somehow inappropriately or unduly influenced by
Plaintiffs counsel. In fact, Defendant's counsel further insults Judge Johansson by claiming
that "[t]he lower court blindly rubber stamped the parade of horribles that the mother's
counsel submitted in his Proposed Additional Findings of Fact..." (Defendant's Opening
Br. p. 7). Further, Defendant's counsel states "[A]ppellant submits that the lower court
merely rubber stamped what Appellee's counsel submitted ..." (Defendant's Opening Br.
p. 23).
These efforts at insulting the trial court, and refusing to give the trial judge credit for
any independent intelligence regarding this matter, is an example of the lengths to which
Defendant will go to attempt to get this Court to substitute its judgment for that of Judge
Johansson. Defendant submits that the record in this case is replete with these kinds of
tactics; andfrankly,such tactics have no place in a court of law.
Defendant spends much of time arguing in his brief that it is improper for this Court
to draw the conclusion that the matters involved in this case were matters ff[o]f credibility,
where only the trial judge can see things mysteriously unknown to the appellate court
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because the appellate court only has the hard, cold record ..." (Defendant's Opening Br.
p. 3). The objective answer to the question posed by Defendant's counsel is a resounding
yes! Credibility is a significant issue in this case and the lower court judge assessed the
demeanor and the credibility of the witnesses carefully. Defendant spends much of his brief
alleging that the lower court judge decided to disregard certain testimony of the father, the
grandmother and the grandfather in this matter. Defendant is outraged by the fact that
Judge Johansson chose to believe witnesses Ken and Barbara Kresser (the mother's in-laws
by the mother's second marriage), Christy Tinnin, Darren Holt, Scott Ortar, and Plaintiff
herself.
Most of the arguments made by Defendant in his opening brief revolve around the
fact that the lower court should have believed him and his parents and because it didn't, the
lower court committed error. However, in response to these arguments, Judge Johansson
made specific and detailed Findings of Fact regarding the credibility of Defendant and his
parents. Prior to making these additional Findings of Fact, the Court stated "Although there
was disputed evidence admitted during the course of the trial, the Courtfindsthe following
facts by clear and convincing evidence to be believable ..." (Appendix 3 at p. 1). The trial
judge indeed recognized that the Utah Court of Appeals in its first Opinion in this matter
questioned whether or not he had considered certain evidence from the mother and the
grandparents in this case; and whether or not the Court considered the opposing evidence
sufficiently clear and convincing to meet the standards of law required to terminate parental
rights in the State of Utah. Judge Johansson therefore made a clear and distinct statement
that accomplished two things:

first he recognized there was contradictory evidence
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presented by Defendant and his parents; and secondly, he recognized (as he did in his
original Findings in this case) that he must exclude that contradictory evidence by finding
that the evidence presented by Plaintiff and her witnesses was "clear and convincing" before
he could terminate parental rights in this case. There is no question that the judge clearly
recognized the standards to be used here, and also recognized the burden of proof that the
Plaintiff had to carry in order to convince the Court it should terminate the Defendant's
parental rights (see Appendix 3 in its entirety).
The Court went on to make several specific and detailed findings regarding the
credibility of the Defendant father of the child in this case in paragraph 7:
i. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, the paternal grandparents, testified that they visited with the child on occasion between
September of 1988 and October 1989, and although the paternal
grandparents claimed that Respondent was present during some
of these grandparent visitation periods, the father's testimony in
this regard was directly impeached and the Court finds his
testimony unreliable, untrustworthy, and unbelievable;

t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from
different residences as being the cause of Respondent's failure to
visit with the child, Respondent failed to have contact with the
child to avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy
Tinnin, Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into
Respondent at a truck stop in February 1989, at a time when she
was aware Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay child
support. Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that conversation
" . . . do me a favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, because I am
supposed to be in Nevada."; (T. 182, 183). (Citation added).
(Appendix 3 at pp. 2, 4).
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The Court also made the following observations regarding the Defendant father's
credibility in his Amended Findings of Fact paragraph 8 (see Appendix 3 at pp. 5,
6)(Transcript page references are added and not part of the Judge's Amended Findings):
d. Respondent's testimony regarding efforts to pay child support
was inherently unbelievable, untrustworthy and unreliable.
Examples from the record as to Respondent's unbelievability are
follows:
1. Respondent claimed to have provided a car
worth $600.00 to Petitioner in lieu of two months
child support (T. 564, 565). However, rebuttal
witness Scott Ortar testified that in fact Respondent
sold the car in question to Sommers Auto Wrecking
approximately three months after the parties' marriage was annulled for $75.00 (T. 475-482). Respondent admitted on cross-examination that he indeed
sold the very same vehicle he claimed to have given
Petitioner in lieu of child support to Sommers Auto
Wrecking for $75.00; and further admitted that he
did not give the $75.00 to Petitioner (T. 571, 572,
573, 574).
2. Related to, but in addition to the foregoing
regarding the car, Respondent testified on direct
examination he did not give Petitioner title to the
1979 Mercury he was providing her in lieu of child
support after the annulment, because he did not
have the title. Despite this clear testimony by
Respondent, Petitioner introduced at trial Exhibit 7
which is a Utah Certificate of Title to the 1979
Mercury in question and related documents. This
exhibit clearly showed that the Utah Certificate of
Title was issued in the name of Respondent, and
was never in the name of Petitioner. Furthermore,
this exhibit showed that Respondent signed the
document as "transferor" before a notary public on
February 5, 1988. This was the veiy date of the
check introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 made out to
Respondent from Sommers Auto Wrecking. Moreover, the VIN number of the vehicle on the Certificate of Title and the check made out to Richard D.
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Fazzio from Sommers Auto Wrecking are exactly
the same, and clearly establish that this was the
same vehicle Respondent claimed to have given
Petitioner in lieu of child support. When confronted
with the title to the car and the check from
Sommers Wrecking on cross-examination by Petitioner's attorney, Respondent testified he wished to
changed his testimony about not having the title to
the vehicle and giving it to Petitioner in lieu of child
support (T. 564, 571).
3. Pursuant to the Decree of Annulment issued by
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson in Civil No.
D-87-3798 on November 19, 1987, Petitioner alone
was entitled to claim R.A.F. as a dependent on her
income tax return (Decree of Annulment paragraph
2, Appendix 4).
4. Although Respondent had stated on crossexamination that he had always been truthful with
government agencies, Petitioner's attorney on crossexamination showed Respondent Exhibit 8 which is
Respondent's 1987 Tax Return. Petitioner's attorney asked Respondent if everything reported on
his 1987 Tax Return was true, and Respondent replied it was. Yet he claimed R.A.F. as a deduction
in violation of the Decree of Annulment despite his
failure to pay in child support (T. 580).
5. On cross-examination, Respondent was shown
Petitioner's Exhibit 9 which was Respondent's 1988
Income Tax Return. Respondent admitted he paid
no child support for 1988, but that the tax return
showed that he was claiming R.A.F. as a dependent
stating to the IRS that R.A.F. had lived in Respondent's home six months during 1988. Respondent
admitted that that was not true and that he had
apparently made a mistake in believing that his son,
R.A.F., had lived in his home for six months in 1988
when he was living in Wyoming, Nevada and with his
grandmother in Salt Lake City (T. 581, 582).
6. The false statements made to the federal
government on the income tax return claiming
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R.A.F. as a dependent under circumstances where
he did not pay child support made Respondent's
testimony incredible and unbelievable.
The trial judge found in his Amended Findings for paragraph 10, (see Appendix 3 at
p. 7):
10. Subsequent to the birth of said child, Respondent had the opportunity to legally declare his
paternity for the minor child, but he failed to do so
in order to prevent the State of Utah or other
persons or agencies from requiring him to meet his
financial obligations as a parent.
a. Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from a prior
marriage, and the father of Petitioner's child Darren
Christopher Holt, received notice in approximately
December of 1986 from the Department of Recovery Services stating he was responsible for child
support for R.A.F. Mr. Holt testified that he approached Respondent numerous times regarding this
situation and asked him to submit to tests or sign a
legal document admitting to the paternity of R.A.F.
Respondent steadfastly refused to ever sign a document with the Department of Recovery Services
acknowledging his paternity of R.A.F. Mr. Holt
contacted Respondent some 14 or 15 times attempting to get him to admit to his paternity of R.A.F.
with the State and Respondent consistently refused
(T. 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 591, 592).
b. Although Respondent claimed he had signed a
document upon the birth of RA.F. acknowledging
paternity, Respondent was unable to provide a copy
of any document, or even an identification of a
document he had signed acknowledging paternity
when challenged to do so at trial by Petitioner's
counsel (T. 590, 591). The result of Respondent's
failure to acknowledge the paternity of R.A.F. to the
State of Utah was that Darren Holt paid child
support to the State of Utah's Department of
Recovery Services on behalf of R.A.F., an obligation
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that was rightfully that of Respondent. (Transcript
citations added).
Judge Johansson found then, approximately nine separate specific facts relating to the
incredibility and unbelievability of Defendant in the trial in the lower court. In most cases,
Defendant was directly impeached with documentary evidence or the testimony of other
witnesses. Certainly it is true that the specific areas in which the Court found the Defendant
to have been lying and/or intentionally misrepresenting the truth were significant in and of
themselves; but it is also true that a trier of fact has the right to call into the question the
whole of the testimony of any witness found to have wilfully testified falsely as to any
material matter. Gittens v. Lundberg. 284 P.2d 1115 (Utah 1955); J.I.F.U. § 3.12 (1957).
Thus, it can be seen that where Judge Johansson specifically determined that Defendant had
wilfully testified falsely on several occasions, he was at liberty under Utah law to disregard
the whole of Defendant's testimony. He did not have to do so, but it is clear from the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Defendant's testimony was so badly impeached
that he chose to disregard it in many areas.
Since the Court then had every right to disregard the testimony of Defendant on any
subject he chose, not just the subjects he was directly impeached on, Defendant's argument
in his opening brief that the Court has disregarded or ignored his testimony is hollow and
empty. In each case where Defendant claims his testimony was ignored or not considered,
the Court found that there was credible, reliable and trustworthy evidence from Plaintiff or
her witnesses. For example, Defendant argues on page 17 and 18 of his opening brief that
he had testified regarding the number of visits he had with the minor child and how often
he had allegedly seen the minor child. He then draws the conclusion that the Court was in
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error in accepting the mother's testimony on direct examination and rejecting the father's
regarding the number of visits or the frequency of the visits. Nevertheless, disregarding the
father's testimony was the prerogative of the trial judge, given the number of material
falsehoods testified to by the Defendant father during the course of the trial.
In addition, Defendant attempts to impeach the Amended Finding of Fact paragraph
7(h) and (i) in regard to the Defendant's visitation with the minor child during times when
he was at Defendant's mother and father's home, by quoting his testimony regarding his
having fed and diapered the child. (Defendant's Opening Br. p. 21). Again, it is the
prerogative of the trier of fact to determine whether or not the Defendant's testimony was
believable, and to disregard it totally if found not to be believable.
Defendant also cites his testimony regarding visitation matters (Defendant's Opening
Brief p. 30); child support matters (Defendant's Opening Br. p. 33); and acknowledgment
of paternity (Defendant's Opening Brief p. 41), as examples of areas in which his own
testimony directly contradicted the testimony of Plaintiff and her witnesses; and he complains
the Court apparently disregarded his testimony. Again, the trial judge had every prerogative
to disregard Defendant's testimony in light of his untruthfulness; and in doing so, if the
Court believed the mother and her witnesses on these issues, the Court would have been
able to find by clear and convincing evidence that the facts were as the mother testified.
Finally with regard to the credibility of the Defendant Father, Defendant notes in his
Opening Brief at page 33 that he was "critically injured in an automobile accident."
Plaintiffs counsel has searched the record and is unable to see where he testified to this fact
or how it prevented him from paying child support for over two years, and no citation to the
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record exists. Furthermore, Defendant used as an excuse for not paying child support to the
mother that he believed ff[a]ny monies payable would be paid to Recovery Services and not
the mother, and that the payment or lack of payment to them did not increase or decrease
any sums to the mother." (Defendant's Opening Brief p. 33). Apparently, Defendant
believes that he should not have been required to pay child support to the mother if he
knew it simply was going to go to Recovery Services and "not the mother." Such lame
justifications for not paying his child support obligations, coupled with his outright false
statements on numerous other occasions during the trial, led the trial judge to become
convinced that his lamentations about efforts to see the minor child and meet his support
obligations were consistent with his pattern of falsehoods and lies during the trial. It would
be a terrible injustice to the mother and child in this case for this Court to substitute its
judgment regarding the credibility of the father for that of the trial judge under circumstances where this Court could not view the demeanor of the Defendant.
Defendant alleges that his own testimony, particularly with regard to visitation of the
minor child, was supported and corroborated by that of his parents, Richard and Steffany
Fazzio. With regard to the parents, it is again important to note that the trial judge was in
the position to observe the demeanor and manner of testimony of these witnesses. He was
also in a direct position to analyze their trustworthiness, reliability, and general credibility.
In that regard, Judge Johansson stated in paragraph 7 (see Appendix 3 p. 2):
j . The grandparents' testimony in regard to their son's visitations
seemed unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great
interest in maintaining contact with R.A.F., and in light of the fact
that their testimony was impeached on several occasions. For
instance the grandparents' willingness to exaggerate the truth
regarding their son's contact with the child was shown by their
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testimony regarding the court-ordered visitation occurring
between March and the time of the trial in the instant case in
August 1990. While suggesting that Petitioner was hard to find,
Mrs. Fazzio admitted that Petitioner brought the child to her and
her husband for visitation for approximately one year (T. 340,
348, 349, 351). Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted on crossexamination that she really did not know when Respondent
^Defendant! did or did not see R.A.F. (T. 351). Mrs. Fazzio
admitted that she and her husband were paying the attorney's
fees for the instant action and not Respondent (T. 350);
1. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were purchased for the
child by Respondent (Defendant), but in light of the fact she
testified her son did not pay child support because he had been
unemployed and his earnings were low, her testimony was
unreliable and the court believes it was the paternal grandparents
who were thoughtful enough to purchase the few toys in question
for R.A.F. (T. 318);
m. Mrs Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with
whether or not Petitioner (Plaintiff) had enough money to meet
the basic needs of R.A.F., her grandson (T. 320, 321). Mrs.
Fazzio suggested this was because she felt it was "a matter
between Kim and Cameron . . . [A]nd I did not know that he was
not providing for her. I had no need to do [sic] no that" (T. 321).
Despite this testimony, on at least two different occasions during
Petitioner's attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. Fazzio
admitted that she knew Respondent was not paying child support
to Petitioner, making her testimony less credible (T. 318);
n. Further testimony showing the unreliability and unbelievability
of the testimony of the paternal grandparents came during crossexamination involving court-ordered visitation commenced in June
of 1990, after the instant actions were filed. Mrs. Fazzio admitted
that she was aware that visitation with R.A.F. was to be at her
residence by court order (T. 373). Upon cross-examination, she
admitted that on one occasion, she and her husband left Salt Lake
City with a boat attached to their truck, but dropped off the boat
prior to picking up RAF. at Respondent's residence. She
admitted that after picking up R.A.F., she and her husband went
back and picked up the boat and went boating on Echo Reservoir
with R.A.F. (T. 399, 400), Mrs. Fazzio stated that her boat was
her home and so she didn't feel that she and her husband were
violating Commissioner Peuler's (and Judge Wilkinson's) Order
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that visitation be at their residence (T. 400). She indicated that
"[s]ummer weekends, our boat is our home. . . It's an overnight
boat, it has cooking and sleeping facilities, and we live in it
weekends11 (T. 400). However, when Mrs. Fazzio was asked how
many weekends they had slept overnight on the boat that year,
1990, through August 17, (the day of the trial), she admitted that
they had not slept on the boat once that year (T. 400);
o. Richard Bruce Fazzio, the paternal grandfather, agreed with
his wife that his boat was his personal residence and their exercising visitation in June of 1990, by taking the child boating rather
than to their home in Salt Lake City was not a violation of the
District Court's Order (T. 468). Such testimony shows the
incredulity and unbelievability of the paternal grandparents,
Steffany Fazzio and Richard Bruce Fazzio; (Transcript citations
and designation "Defendant" and "Plaintiff1 as well as emphasis
added) (Appendix 3 at pp. 2, 3).
Furthermore, the trial judge assessed the credibility of Richard and Steffany Fazzio
in paragraph 8 of his Amended Findings (Appendix 3 p. 5):
Petitioner made significant efforts to contact Respondent to get
him to pay child support and was regularly informed by Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, that they did not
know how to contact Respondence and could not give her an
address or telephone number for him (T. 71, 72). This Court
finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio never knew where
their son was so as to allow Petitioner to contact him for purposes
of obtaining her court-ordered child support; (Transcript citations
added).
Given Judge Johansson's assessment of the credibility of Richard and Steffany Fazzio,
it is clear that he had the right to also disregard the whole of their testimony, having
believed that they testified falsely on numerous occasions during the course of the trial.
Certainly, Judge Johansson was sympathetic with Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio and understood why
they might come to the support of their son in this kind of action with inaccurate testimony.
He found that their testimony was unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great
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interest in maintaining contact with the minor child. (Finding of Fact, 1f 7 (j)). The trial
judge believed that it was the paternal grandparents who were thoughtful enough to
purchase the few toys presented in Court for the minor child (Finding of Fact If 7(1)).
Furthermore, the Court found in paragraph 7(p):
[T]he Court believes that the instant action was filed only as a
response to Respondent's parents' concern about their own
visitation with the child, and not their son's.
While the trial judge and this Court should find it commendable that Mr. and Mrs.
Fazzio have a strong desire to maintain contact with their grandchild, R.A.F., it should be
noted that the termination in this case related to parental rights only, and not grandparents'
rights. In fact, the grandparents chose to petition the District Court for specific visitation
rights independent of their son, the Defendant father in this case. Furthermore, on
November 14,1991, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson accepted a recommendation by the
Honorable Michael S. Evans, Domestic Relations Commissioner, and entered an Order
providing the grandparents with specific visitation rights. (See Appendix 7). No orders to
show cause for violation of this Order have been presented to the Third District Court, and
it is Plaintiffs understanding that these visitations have occurred as required.
Nevertheless, despite the good intentions of the Fazzios, their inherent bias made
them untrustworthy, unreliable and incredible as witnesses in this case, as found by Judge
Johansson. In his opening brief, Defendant maintains that the mother's testimony, believed
by the trial judge, should be disregarded by this Appellate Court, and the testimony of the
Defendant's mother and father, which contradicted her, should be believed instead. He says
this is also true with regard to the mother's statements about the father's lack of efforts to
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visit the minor child. Mrs. Fazzio, the paternal grandmother, testified that during many of
the occasions when she and the paternal grandfather would bring R.A.F. to their home for
visits, the Defendant father would visit the child at that time also. However, the trial judge
chose to believe the testimony of Plaintiff when she testified that after September 1988, and
up to the time of the trial in August 1990, Respondent never came to see the child nor
telephoned, nor otherwise contacted the child (T. 75). The trial court had every right to
disregard Mrs. Fazzio's testimony, given her exaggerations and inherent incredibility. Again,
Defendant would have this Court disregard the determinations of the trial judge with regard
to the demeanor of witnesses and their credibility and believability and find that Defendant's
mother was the more believable of the witnesses. This would be inappropriate for this
Court to do in light of the standards of review regarding the presumption of correctness of
the lower court's determination; as well as the requirement of the Defendant to show in this
appeal that the Judge Johansson's conclusions were clearly erroneous and against the clear
weight of the evidence.
Defendant also cites the testimony of the mother with regard to the relationship of
the father with the child. Despite the testimony of Plaintiff that Defendant was never a
parent to R.A.F. from the time he was born; that he refused to babysit the child, even
though he was not working most of the time during their marriage; that Defendant played
no part in the care or nurturing of R.A.F. during the one-year marriage; that he would not
get up at night with the child, he would not change a diaper, and he would not feed a bottle
(T. 23, 24, 25), Defendant argues in his opening brief that his mother (the grandmother's)
statements regarding how he had allegedly nurtured the child and played with the child
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should be believed over that of the Plaintiff. (Defendant's Opening Br. p. 21-23). Again,
the believability of the witnesses was the prerogative of the trial judge, and he chose to
believe Plaintiff and disregard the testimony of Mrs. Fazzio due to her inherent bias and
unbelievability.
It is clear that the trial judge was in the most advantaged position to make the
determination to believe the witnesses, evidence and testimony presented by Plaintiff in this
case, and to disbelieve the majority or even the whole of the testimony of the Defendant and
his parents. The Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant had
indeed abandoned his obligations and responsibilities to his child and that such abandonment
led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship, and his Findings of Fact should be
sustained and affirmed by this Court.
POINT ffl

ON REMAND, THE LOWER COURT ADDRESSED EACH AND
EVERY CONCERN OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Defendant goes through the concerns of the Court of Appeals in his opening brief and
makes certain observations about the deficiencies of the trial judge in responding to them.
Plaintiff will now review those concerns and show this Court where and how the trial judge
did indeed respond.
In its Opinion in Woodward v. Fazzio (the first appeal supra Appendix 2), the Court
of Appeals found "conflicting11 testimony about the frequency and duration of Fazzio's visits
with the child; his treatment of the child during those visits, Woodward's attempts to prevent
Fazzio from visiting with the child, Fazzio's payment of child support; and Fazzio's provision
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of gifts to the child - all facts important to the lower court's ultimate decision that Fazzio's
conduct had destroyed the parent-child relationship.
The Utah Court of Appeals opined that:
[T]he trial court's findings of fact should resolve
these conflicts unequivocally, by stating the specific
subsidiary facts as the trial court found them. The
findings should set forth with as much precision as
possible, the number of times Fazzio visited the
child during particular periods; the length of each of
the visits; the number of visits Woodward intentionally prevented; the sums Fazzio provided as child
support, either personally or through his parents; the
number and type of gifts Fazzio gave to the child
and the occasions on which he gave them; and the
specific statements, acts, or omissions that demonstrate Fazzio's intent to either accept or disregard
his obligations a parent (e.g. instances of Defendant
performing child care functions like changing his
diaper or feeding him, denying that the child was his
responsibility, etc.).
Further, the Findings should explicitly address the
impact Woodward's frequent relocation had on
Fazzio's ability to maintain contact with the child,
the effect Fazzio's living and working outside Utah
had on his visitation, the manner and effect of any
refusal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his
paternity and any other factors bearing on whether
Fazzio consciously disregarded the child to such an
extent that the parent-child relationship was destroyed. The Court's findings as to these issues
should be set forth specifically and should correspond to the factual evidence upon which the Court
relied.
823 P.2d at 478, 479.
It is the position of the Plaintiff that the trial judge did respond to each and every one
of these concerns of the Utah Court of Appeals as follows:
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1. The number of times Fazzio visited the child during particular periods and the
length of each of the visits. In paragraph 7(g), the trial court found: "Although Respondent
came around four or five times from the date of their separation in September of 1987
through September of 1988, he spent very little with R.A.F. After September of 1988,
Respondent never came to see the child nor telephoned, nor contacted the child;11 (T. 75,
76, 77, 78) (Appendix 3 p. 2 - citations added).
The trial court also found Finding of Fact 7(h) as follows: "Petitioner would allow
Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, to see the child occasionally between
September of 1988 and October of 1989, as they requested. However, after the visitations
with Respondent's parents, Petitioner would always ask R.A.F. if he had seen Respondent
during the visitations and R.A.F. would say 'no';" (T. 82, 83) (Appendix 3 p. 2 - citations
added).
Although Defendant challenges the mother's testimony which formed the basis for
these findings, he fails to give any specific reasons as to why the testimony should have been
disregarded by the trial court; and why the testimony of the Defendant and Mr. and Mrs.
Fazzio should have been believed by the trial court. Again, credibility is the key to these
Findings of Fact, and the trial judge chose to believe the mother in this regard. As to
Defendant's argument that the mother would not have had knowledge of whether or not the
father visited with R.A.F. during the times the child visited with his paternal grandparents,
the child himself denied having seen the father on these occasions. Defendant would have
this Court disregard the statements of the child in that respect, but it seemed to the trial
judge to be consistent with the believable evidence, and he chose to give them credibility.
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Besides, if a minor child is questioned by his parents, and is old enough to talk and
conceivably understand the questions, it seems unbelievable that the child would he about
having seen his father. No evidence whatsoever was presented in the lower court to
impeach the credibility of the mother in this regard, or to prove that the child was too young
to really understand the questions. The mother testified that the child understood the
questions, and that was all that mattered to the trial judge given the lack of believability of
Defendant's witnesses. Certainly the evidence was clear and convincing in this regard and
should not be disturbed by this Court.
Despite Defendant's self-serving testimony that he 'Visits R.A.F. every chance he gets,"
his testimony was unbelievable and directly contradicted the testimony of Plaintiff, whom the
trial judge found to believable.
The trial judge made additional precise findings with regard to the number of times
Fazzio visited and the length of those visits:
i. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, the paternal grandparents, testified that they visited with the child on occasion between
September of 1988 and October of 1989, and although the
paternal grandparents claimed that Respondent was present
during some of these grandparent visitation periods, the father's
testimony in this regard was directly impeached and the Court
finds his testimony unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable;
Furthermore, in Finding of Fact 7(j) the trial judge also found:
j. [T]he grandparents testimony in regard to their son's visitations
seemed unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great
interest in maintaining contact with R.A.F., and in light of the fact
that their testimony was impeached on several occasions. For
instance, the grandparents willingness to exaggerate the truth
regarding their son's contact with the child was shown by their
testimony regarding the court-ordered visitation occurring
between March and the time of the trial in the instant case in
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August 1990. While suggesting that Petitioner was hard to find,
Mrs. Fazzio admitted that Petitioner brought the child to her and
her husband for visitation for approximately one year (T. 340,
348, 349, 351). Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted on crossexamination that she really did not know when Respondent did
or did not see R.A.F. (T. 352). Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she and
her husband were paying the attorney's fees for the instant action
and not Respondent (T. 350). (Appendix 3 p. 2 - citations and
emphasis added).
Therefore, it should seem clear to this Appellate Court that the trial judge found that
he could not determine with any reliability or credibility the number and frequency of the
visits of Fazzio with the child due to lack of credibility of the witnesses in that regard. He
found that the only credible testimony in this regard was that of the mother who testified
that Defendant came around only four or five times from the date of their last separation
in September of 1987 and through September 1988; and then never bothered to see R.A.F.,
nor telephone, nor contact the child in any way after that. Therefore, the trial judge has
specifically and directly addressed this concern of the Court of Appeals.
With regard to the duration or length of each of the visits, Plaintiff would submit there
was little, if any, testimony regarding the time actually spent with the child. The only
credible testimony in this regard resulted in Finding of Fact paragraph 7(u):
Even though Respondent was provided with court-ordered
visitation after filing of the instant lawsuit, he did not make an
effort to spend much time with the child during the court-ordered
visitations. Ken Kresser, the husband of Barbara Kresser and
step-father of Mark Woodward and Petitioner's present husband,
testified that after the May 1990 court-ordered visitation with
Respondent, he asked R.A.F. about the visitation. R.A.F. replied
that he had gone to the park. When Mr. Kresser asked him if
Cameron (Respondent) was there with him, R.A.F. stated "No, he
was sleeping."; (T. 173). (Appendix 3 pp. 4, 5 - citations added).
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While Defendant would have the Court disregard this as merely a single isolated
incident, the trial judge, assessing the credibility and believability of the witnesses, chose not
to disregard it and felt it was significant enough to make a detailed Finding of Fact about
this incident.
With regard to the quality of the visits or length of the visits, the trial judge also made
these additional Findings in paragraph 7:
q. R.A.F. believes his dad is Petitioner's present husband, Mark
Woodward (T. 83). He simply did not know who is biological
father was as a result of his biological father's failure to make any
serious efforts to visit with him;
r. Petitioner allowed court-ordered visitation when requested
between March of 1990 and the time of trial in this matter
(August 1990), although there were only three occasions when
Respondent took advantage of the opportunity to visit the child
during this period of time. After one of these visitations, R.A.F.
explained to Petitioner "Mom, Cameron told me he's my dad.
He's not my dad." On another occasion, after a court-ordered
visitation, RA.F. was asked by Petitioner who Cameron (Respondent) was, and he would say that he was Brian's brother; and
when asked by Petitioner who his dad was, he would always say
"Mark" (R.A.F.'s step-father) (T. 88);
s. Witnesses Barbara Kresser and Ken Kresser, the parents of
R.A.F.'s step-father, Mark Woodward, testified that R.A.F. has
never mentioned Respondent or anything about his natural father,
and that contrary to the claims of the Respondent, R.A.F. has not
been taught anything by the family with regard to who his father
is, that it is just a natural relationship and a happy family (T.
138); (Appendix 3 p. 4 - citations added (except in 1f q.)).
Therefore, it can readily be seen that the trial judge did indeed make specific detailed
findings of subsidiary facts and resolved the conflicts and the evidence unequivocally.
2. The number of visits Woodward intentionally prevented. The trial judge made the
following detailed specific finding in this regard in paragraph 7:
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t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from
different residences being the cause of Respondent's failure to
visit with the child, Respondent failed to have contact with the
child to avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy
Tinnin, Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into
Respondent at a truck stop in February of 1989, at a time when
she was aware Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay
child support. Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that
conversation f,[D]o me a favor and don't tell Kim you saw me,
because I am supposed to be in Nevada."; (T. 182, 183) (Appendix 3 p. 4 - citations added).
Thus, Judge Johansson determined specifically that Defendant had failed to visit with
the minor child intentionally; and that Defendant's desire to avoid paying child support
motivated his lack of visitation and contact with the child. Again, it was the trial judge's
prerogative to believe the Plaintiff in this case, and he did believe her. He also ruled that
the evidence she presented was clear and convincing with regard to her good faith in not
intentionally preventing Defendant from visiting with the child.
Plaintiff would like to address one additional point made by Defendant in his opening
brief on this subject. Defendant argues that the only way the father was going to receive
visitation was through Court orders after Plaintiff had provided a letter (which was Exhibit
4 during the course of the trial) which is characterized in Defendant's brief as "terminating
all visitation with the minor child." This statement by Defendant is absolutely false!
Appendix 8 is the note submitted by Plaintiff to Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio on one occasion after
she voluntarily allowed the Fazzios to visit with the minor child. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY
NOTHING IN THIS NOTE WHICH INDICATES THAT PLAINTIFF INTENDED TO
TERMINATE THE VISITATION OF THE GRANDPARENTS OR THE DEFENDANT
WITH THE MINOR CHILD UNILATERALLY. That note simply discusses the problems
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that Plaintiff observed with regard to Mr. and Mrs. Fazzios' visitation with the minor child.
The note ends by stating "As you know, I am leaving soon and I am not sure when I will be
back, but when both Mark and I are back, we will bring Tony to see you." It is to be noted
here that the following exchange occurred between Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant on
cross examination in the trial of this case regarding Defendant's Exhibit 4:
"Q. When your parents got the note suggesting that this voluntary
visitation they'd been given for the few months prior was going to
be terminated (at least for awhile), why didn't you call Kim
personally and say, Okay, maybe you don't want to give the child
to my parents, but I want to exercise my visitation?
A. Because I had agreed, this was an arrangement where I - we
had agreed that my visitation would take place at my parents'
house, being as I am out of town, in and out of town a lot. That
way, I don't have to - I can come in, I can come in at night, I can
sleep, I can wake up, R.A.F. can be there, I can spend the day
with R.A.F.
Q. Why then didn't you personally get involved and contact Kim?
A. I was in Las Vegas.
Q. What, you can't pick up a phone and call her from Las
Vegas? You had her telephone number.
A. When you don't have - not at first when I went down there
I didn't, Mr. Keller.
Q. As a matter of fact, you haven't called Kim and requested
visitation yourself personally since September of 1988, isn't that
true, Mr. Fazzio? Yes or No.
A. Yes."
(T. 616, 617).
This exchange clearly shows that Defendant admitted that he had not personally called
Plaintiff for visitation for well in excess of one year. He then admits that he made no effort
whatsoever to contact Plaintiff for visitation between September 1988 and the court-ordered
visitation beginning in March of 1990. This has to be the most damaging evidence of all
against Defendant.
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3. The sums Fazzio provided as child support, either personally or through his
parents. With regard to this concern of the Court of Appeals, the trial judge made the
following additional Findings in paragraph 7:
k. Although Mrs. Fazzio testified that she and her husband had
submitted child support payments to Petitioner once this termination action was filed, she claims it was on behalf of Respondent;
however, she admitted Respondent only reimbursed her for three
of the nine checks she claimed to have sent to Petitioner (T. 322).
Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that no offers were made to
pay the child support to Petitioner until this termination action
was filed on January 26, 1990, by Petitioner (T. 354);
m. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with
whether or not Petitioner had enough money to meet the basic
needs of R.A.F., her grandson (T. 320, 321). Mrs. Fazzio
suggested this was because she felt it was fla matter between Kim
and Cameron . . . [A]nd I did not know that he was not providing
for her. I had no need to do [sic know] that." Despite this
testimony, on at least two different occasions during Petitioner's
attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she
knew Respondent was not paying child support to Petitioner,
making her testimony less credible (T. 318); (Appendix 3 pp. 2,
3 - citations added).
Furthermore, the Court went on to make a great many detailed specific Findings of
Fact in paragraph 8 in support of the conclusion that "Respondent has paid no child support
to Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio. Due to
space limitations, these findings will not be detailed here, and the reader is directed to
Appendix 3 and paragraph 8 in its entirety, where Judge Johansson makes 10 very specific
and detailed Findings of Fact regarding this issue.
In his brief, Defendant attempts to argue that he did not pay child support to Plaintiff
because he thought it would simply be obtained by Recovery Services and somehow he
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believed that excused him from paying his child support (Defendant's Opening Br. at 33; T.
556 and following). He further states that he simply was financially unable to pay child
support and so virtually the entire allegation of Defendant that he paid some child support
rests totally on his own credibility (which the Court has found to be non-existent) and also
upon his justifications (which are not logical or reasonable).
Finally on this point, a specific finding made by Judge Johansson in paragraph 8
addresses child support allegedly provided by Defendant through his parents:
c. Only after Petitioner filed her Petition for Termination of
Parental Rights did she receive any checks from anyone regarding
child support. She did receive certain checks from the grandparents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, at that time, supposedly on
behalf of Respondent, but her attorney advised her to return
those checks (T. 133). The evidence is uncontroverted that no
monies were ever submitted to Petitioner on a checking account
with Respondent's name on it. Nor was there any evidence that
Respondent had provided any money to Petitioner; (Appendix 3
at p. 5).
Therefore, the Court has made specific and detailed Findings of Fact with regard to
alleged payment of child support in this case.
4. The number and type of gifts Fazzio gave to the child and the occasions on which
he gave them. Judge Johansson found in Finding of Fact paragraph 7 as follows:
1. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were purchased for the
child by Respondent, but in light of the fact she testified her son
did not pay child support because he had been unemployed and
his earnings were low, her testimony was unreliable and the Court
believes it was the paternal grandparents who were thoughtful
enough to purchase the few toys in question for R.A.F. (T. 318).
Again, the matter comes down to a question of the credibility of the witnesses. It is
true, as Defendant states in his opening brief, that a few toys and trinkets were produced
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before the Court as alleged evidence of items purchased by the father for his minor child.
However, given the inherent lack of credibility of both the father and the paternal
grandparents, the Court chose to disbelieve that these toys were all purchased by Defendant.
It obviously seemed just too convenient to the judge that at the time of trial, when the
father's relationship with the child is in question, the parents bring a few toys and trinkets
and claim the father purchased them. There was no corroboration whatsoever for their
testimony.

Given the totality of the circumstances and evidence of this case, it was

appropriate for the judge to make the Finding of Fact he did in regard to these few trinkets
and toys.
5. The specific statements, acts, or omissions that demonstrate Fazzio's intent
to either accept or disregard his oblieations as a parent The trial judge addressed this issue
specifically with detailed findings. In paragraph 7, the trial judge made the following
Amended Findings of Fact:
a. Respondent admitted that he urged Petitioner to get an
abortion when he first learned she was pregnant with R.A.F.
Respondent urged Petitioner to get an abortion on more than one
occasion (T. 20, 21, 585, 586);
b. Respondent did not actively participate in the parenting of
R.A.F. from the time he was born. He refused to babysit the
child, even though he was not working most of the time during
the parties' marriage. Respondent would not get up at night with
the child, would not change a diaper, and would not bottle feed
the child (T. 23, 24, 25);
c. Respondent refused to take financial responsibility of R.A.F.
during the course of the marriage and never gave her any money
for the child, except as mentioned in paragraph (m) (T. 29, 30);
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d. After the parties separated for the last time, Petitioner spoke
to Respondent many times about needing money and child
support, and he refused to give her any child support (T. 30);
f. Petitioner received no child support received from Respondent
and she tried constantly to locate him, but was unable. Even
though Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived
at the same address during this entire period of time, they would
refuse to tell her Respondent's address. When Petitioner saw
Respondent, she asked him for child support and he refused to
give it to her (T. 71, 72, 73, 74) (Appendix 3 pp. 1, 2 - citations
added).
Plaintiff could actually cite as responses to this particular concern of the Court of
Appeals virtuaUy every single one of the 44 additional specific and detailed Findings of Fact
made by Judge Johansson in his Amended Findings of Fact dated June 15,1992- However,
because of space limitations and to avoid repetition, nothing more than what has been set
out here will be presented in this portion of the brief.
6. The impact of the relocation of the parties on Fazzio's visitation. As indicated
previously in this brief, the detailed Amended Findings of Fact of Judge Johansson
addressed this issue specifically in paragraph 7 as follows:
f. Petitioner received no child support from Respondent and she
tried constantly to locate him, but was unable. Even though
Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived at the
same address during this entire period of time, they would refuse
to tell her Respondent's address. When Petitioner saw Respondent, she asked him for child support and he refused to give it to
her (T. 71, 72, 73, 74);
j . [W]hile suggesting that Petitioner was hard to find, Mrs. Fazzio
admitted that Petitioner brought the child to her and her husband
for visitation for approximately one year. Furthermore, Mrs.
Fazzio admitted on cross-examination that she really did not know
when Respondent did or did not see R A F
(T. 340,348,349,
350, 351, 352);
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t. The Courtfindsthat rather than Petitioner's movements from
different residences being the cause of Respondent's failure to
visit with the child, Respondent failed to have contact with the
child to avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy
Tinnin, Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into
Respondent at a truck stop in February of 1989 at a time when
she was aware Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay
child support. Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that
conversation "[D]o me a favor and don't tell Kim you saw me,
because I am supposed to be in Nevada" (T. 182,183) (Appendix
3 pp. 2,4 - citations added).
In paragraph 8, the Court made the following Findings relevant to this instruction
from the Court of Appeals:
b. Petitioner made significant efforts to contact Respondent to
get him to pay child support and was regularly informed by
Respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, that they did
not know how to contact Respondent and could not give her an
address or telephone number for him (T. 71, 72). This Court
finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio never knew where
their son was so as to allow Petitioner to contact him for purposes
of obtaining her court-ordered child support; (Appendix 3 p. 5 citations added).
It is clear that Judge Johansson did not believe that the allegations about Plaintiffs
moving several times during the two or three year period in question had any significant
impact on Defendant's ability to exercise his visitationrightsif he had chosen to do so. In
fact, since the Fazzios testified that they had visitation with the child for approximately one
year (T. 340, 348, 349, 351), it seems clear that it was not either the Plaintiffs or the
Defendant's moving from place to place and from time to time that had an impact on the
father's exercise of his visitation rights. He could have visited with the child if he had
wanted to, but the Court found it believable that he had not exercised said visitation rights.
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7. The manner and effect of anv reflisal on Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his
paternity. This issue was specifically addressed by the trial judge in paragraph 10 of his
Amended Findings of Fact. (See Appendix 3 p. 7). The entirety of paragraph 10 will not
be set out in this portion of the brief, but the judge clearly found that f,[S]ubsequent to the
birth of said child, Respondent had the opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the
minor child, but he failed to do so in order to prevent the State of Utah or other persons
or agencies from requiring him to meet his financial obligations as a parent." The judge
then sets out two other specificfindingsin paragraph 10 which address this point.
8. Other factors bearing on whether Fazzio consciously disregarded the child to such
an extent that the parent-child relationship was destroyed. Again, in addressing this
particular issue, Plaintiff is inclined to simply request that the Court review all of the 44
additional Findings of Fact made by Judge Johansson in the Amended Findings of Fact
dated June 15, 1992 (Appendix 2). Specifically however, the Court is asked to review the
detailed and specific Findings of Fact in paragraph 7, subsection (b), regarding Defendant's
failure to actively participate in the parenting of R.A.F. from the time he was born;
paragraph 7, subsection (c), regarding his failure to take financial responsibility for R.A.F.;
paragraph 7, subsection (e), which reads as follows:
e. On one occasion, Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair
and had her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor
when she started calling for Christopher (her son from a prior
marriage) to run over to the neighbors and have them call the
police. As soon as he moved, Respondent said "If anybody moves
off that couch, I'll kill her." R.A.F. was one of the two children
present on the couch observing this physical abuse to his mother
and the threat to kill her. Both R.A.F. and Christopher were
terrified and they were taken by the police to the YWCA after
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this incident (T. 42, 43, 44) (Appendix 3 pp. 1, 8 - citations
added).
Although Defendant seems to make light of this situation by suggesting that the minor
child was only a year old at the time, it is arrogant and irresponsible for Defendant to
believe that this could not have had an effect on the minor child. Certainly, this kind of
abuse is emotional abuse and child psychologists and scientists are just now determining what
a large impact the viewing of such a violent and traumatic scene by a small child can have
on the child for literally the rest of his life. To suggest that such violence does not in any
way create a destruction of the parent-child relationship as Defendant does in his opening
brief, is in and of itself irresponsible and indicative of his attitude toward R.A.F.
The Court further addressed the specific point of the Court of Appeals regarding the
destruction of the parent-child relationship in paragraph 7(g) as it relates Defendant's failure
to spend much time with the child after the parties separated; and paragraphs 7(h), (i), (j),
(q), (r), (s) and (u), all relating to the fact that the child simply had not seen his father
during the course of the visitations with his grandparents.
Certainly, the refusal of Defendant to acknowledge the paternity of his child by signing
a simple statement to the Department of Recovery of Services as requested by witness
Darren Holt, has to have had a bearing on the destruction of the parent-child relationship,
simply by virtue of the father refusing to accept his responsibilities and obligations for the
child. Paragraph 10 with its subparagraphs (a) and (b) are clear indications of this refusal
to accept responsibility. Furthermore, the Amended Findings of Fact in paragraph 11 with
all of its subparagraphs are clear evidence of physical abuse to Petitioner and her children,
including R.A.F. Again, to suggest that the mere fact that Defendant "smacked Kim" when
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R.A.F. was present could not have affected the parent-child relationship because R.A.F. was
too small as Defendant does in his opening brief, is irresponsible and certainly not supported
by evidence in the lower court or anywhere else. Defendant would have this Court dismiss
what he terms as the "parade of horribles11 set out specifically and in detail by Judge
Johansson in his Amended Findings of Fact in paragraph 11. However, Plaintiff submits that
the violent and abusive nature of Defendant during the course of the time he lived with
R.A.F. and the minor child's step-brother, Christopher Holt, are clear indications that
Defendant is an unfit parent whose physical and emotional violence towards his wife and his
children contributed to the destruction of the parent-child relationship.

It remains

uncontroverted, that no parent-child relationship exists at the present time with regard to
Defendant and R.A.F. R.A.F. does not consider Defendant his father, as found specifically
and in detail by Judge Johansson. In the case of State In Interest of M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d
1216 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals held that the termination of a father's
parental rights was supported by evidence of his failure to recognize deficiencies in his lifestyle choices or parenting abilities, persistent denial of any justification for the State's
intervention, rejection of all advice from professionals, and unpredictable behavior and
severe mood swings. Plaintiff would argue that the instant case is similar in that Defendant
in the lower court denied the emotionally and physical abusive activities with respect to his
wife and the minor children under his care as a parent. Defendant, it seems, would thus not
be amenable to treatment for these conditions. His persistent falsehoods in the trial of this
matter are clear indications that he is a person who will say anything to support his own
point of view, and one who refuses to recognize his deficiencies. Although the Salata case
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involved a termination of parentalrightsthrough State action, the principal is similar to the
instant case.
According to Utah case law, abandonment of a child can be proven by "either
objective evidence of the parent's conduct or by the expressed, subjective intent of the
parent". State, In Interest of M.S. v Lochner. 815 P.2d 1325 (Utah App. 1991); In the
Interest of J.C.O. v. Anderson. 734 P.2d 458, 462 (Utah 1987). In the instant case, the clear
and convincing evidence of Defendant's objective conduct relative to his child convinced the
trial court that the parent-child relationship had been destroyed; and thus the second prong
of the test for abandonment of a child set out in State Ex Rel. Summers Children v.
Wulffenstein. 560 P.2d 331 (Utah 1977) has been met in the instant case. Plaintiff submits
there is no question that there was clear and convincing evidence in the lower court that "the
parent's conduct evidenced a conscious disregard for his parental obligations" to the child,
which is the first prong of the termination test. Wulffenstein, Id. at 1159 citing State Ex.
Rel. J.R.T. v. Timperlv. 750 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1988); Woodward v. Fazzio, supra at 477..
The true attitude of the father is demonstrated by his continual request in his opening
brief in this matter for the Court of Appeals to "reverse and remand this matter once again
to the trial court, with instructions to set out meaningful visitation with the father"
(Defendant's Opening Br. p. 50). The father requests that this Court give him his visitation,
but does not suggest that this Court should order that the trial court upon remand should
order the payment of back child support, or order the father to pay child support on a
regular and ongoing basis, or order the father to acknowledge paternity of the child officiaUy
with agencies of the State of Utah, or order the Defendant to accept any of the other
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obligations and responsibilities attendant to fatherhood. The Defendant in this case is the
typical example of the "dead beat dad" who refused to accept his parental obligations. Judge
Johansson found that his overall course of conduct with his child destroyed the parent-child
relationship.
A final word needs to be said about the statement of the Court of Appeals that ,![T]he
timely assertion of such a petition (for specific visitation) is hardly the conduct of a
disinterested parent." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d at 479. In light of Judge Johansson's
Findings of Fact that it was the grandparents who desired visitation with the child (Findings
of Fact 7(j)); that it was the grandparents who were paying for the instant action and not
the Defendant (Finding of Fact 7); that Defendant had only reimbursed the grandparents
for three of nine checks for child support sent to Plaintiff after this action was begun (none
were accepted as being untimely given this litigation) (Finding of Fact 7(k)); that the Court
believed that it was the "grandparents who were thoughtful enough to purchase the few toys
in question for R.AJF." (Finding of Fact 7(1)); that during a court-ordered visitation in May
1990, the grandparents took the child to a park while Defendant was sleeping (Finding of
Fact 7(u)); the Court of Appeals needs to revisit the idea that Defendant was really
responsible for the request for specific visitation rights.
Judge Johansson made the most telling Finding of Fact of all on this point in
paragraph 7(p): "The Court believes that the instant action was filed only as a response to
Respondent's parent's concern about their own visitation with the child, and not their son's."
(Appendix 3 p. 4).
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CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals gave Judge Olof A. Johansson a mandate to make more
detailed Findings of Fact supporting his Conclusions of Law and Judgment terminating the
Defendant's parental rights in this case; or reverse his decision if he was unable to make
such additional detailed Findings of Fact. The Honorable Olof A. Johansson has responded
with some 44 additional Findings of Fact which clearly and convincingly show that the
Defendant's parentalrightswith regard to R.A.F. should be terminated. The Defendant has
failed to meet his burden of showing that the trial judge's Findings of Fact were "clearly
erroneous" and "against the great weight of the evidence". Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals
is urged by Plaintiff to affirm the lower court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Decree terminating Defendant's parental rights in this case.
DATED this ^

day of May, 1993.

Attornev^or Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class
postage prepaid, on this «3.*f day of May, 1993, to:
John Walsh
Attorney for Defendant
Suite 270, 2319 Foothill Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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APPENDIX 1

their minor children and parents petitioned for
restoration of custody on grounds of changed
conditions, refusal of juvenile court to grant
parents a hearing was an abuse of discretion.
In re State ex rel. L.J J., 11 Utah 2d 393, 360
P.2d 486 (1961).

Cited in State ex rel. A.H. v. Mr. & Mrs. H.,
716 P.2d 284 (Utah 1986).

78-3a-48- Termination of parental rights — Grounds —
Hearing — Effect of order — Placement of child
— Voluntary petition of parent
(1) The court may decree a termination of all parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if the court finds either (a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows:
(a) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent by reason of
conduct or condition which is seriously detrimental to the child;
(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child. It is prima
facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or parents, although having legal custody of the child, have surrendered physical custody of the
child, and for a period of six months following the surrender have not
manifested to the child or to the person having the physical custody of the
child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements for the care of the child;
(c) that after a period of trial, during which the child was left in his
own home under protective supervision or probation, or during which the
child was returned to live in his own home, the parent or parents substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or failed to give the child
proper parental care and protection; or
(d) has failed to communicate via mail, telephone, or otherwise for one
year with the child or shown the normal interest of a natural parent,
without just cause.
(2) A termination of parental rights may be ordered only after a hearing is
held specifically on the question of terminating the rights of the parent or
parents. A verbatim record of the proceedings must be taken and the parties
must be advised of their right to counsel. No hearing may be held earlier than
ten days after service of summons is completed inside or outside of the state.
The summons must contain a statement to the effect that the rights of the
parent or parents are proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceedings. The statement may be made in the summons originally issued in the
proceeding or in a separate summons subsequently issued.
(3) Unless there is an appeal from the order terminating the rights of one or
both parents, the order permanently terminates the legal parent-child relationship and all the rights and duties, including residual parental rights and
duties, of the parent or parents involved.
(4) Upon the entry of an order terminating the rights of the parent or
parents, the court may (a) place the child in the legal custody and guardianship of a child placement agency or the department of public welfare for
purposes of adoption, or (b) make any other disposition of the child authorized
under Section 78-3a-39. All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption.
(5) The parent-child relationship may be terminated upon voluntary petition of one or both parents if the court finds that the termination is in the best
interests of the parent and the child. This termination with respect to one
parent does not affect the rights of the other parent.
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dant claims he should have been convicted
and, thus, sentenced for arson rather than
aggravated arson, as both offenses proscribe the conduct for which he was convicted. Therefore, we find defendant's justification for our reaching his Shondel argument, raised for the first time on appeal,
without merit. Defendant's Shondel claim
presents neither "plain error" nor "exceptional circumstances" and, therefore, we
refuse to consider it for the first time on
appeal. See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 926.
CONCLUSION
In sum, because defendant failed to marshal the evidence supporting his jury conviction for aggravated arson, we refuse to
consider his claim of insufficient evidence.
Furthermore, we decline to entertain the
merits of defendant's Shondel claim, as he
raises it for the first time on appeal. We,
therefore, affirm his conviction for aggravated arson.
BENCH, PJ., and GARFF, J., concur.

Kim (Fazzio) WOODWARD,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
•.

Richard Cameron FAZZIO, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 900626-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 9, 1991.
Father's parental rights were terminated by order of the Third District Juvenile
"because of the clear error in the original sentences." State v. Babbel 770 P.2d 987, 994
(Utah 1989). In the later Babbel case, the defendant challenged the remand sentence which was
harsher than his original sentence.
The later Babbel case distinguished the "correction of an illegal sentence [which] stands on

Court, Summit County, Olaf A. Johansson,
J., and father appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) trial court's
findings of fact were inadequate, and (2)
affirmance as a matter of law was precluded, thus requiring remand, in light of disputed evidence in the record.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Infants <s=>180
"Prima facie" showing of abandonment as set forth in statute concerning
termination of parental rights may be established only for custodial parent, but
abandonment by noncustodial parent may
also be established by clear and convincing
evidence that parent's conduct evidenced a
conscious disregard for his or her parental
obligations to the child, and that the disregard led to destruction of the parentchild relationship. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-48.
2. Parent and Child «=»2(8)
There is strong presumption that child
is better off in the care of its natural
parents, or at least having some relationship with its natural parents, and absent
clear and convincing evidence that parent's
disregard for his or her obligations caused
destruction of parent-child relationship,
presumption against termination of parental rights will govern.
3. Trial <®=>395(5)
Findings of fact must embody sufficient detail and include enough subsidiary
facts to clearly show the evidence on which
they are grounded. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
52(a).
4. Appeal and Error e=»1008.1(l)
Court of Appeals will grant deference
to fact finder only when findings of fact
are sufficiently detailed to disclose the evia different footing from the correction of an
error in a conviction." Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88.
This distinction pertains to this case because
defendant contends not that his sentence is illegal but that his conviction was erroneous.
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itiary basis for the court's decision,
les Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a).
Appeal and Error <s=>757(3)
Appellant need not go through the fuexercise of marshalling evidence when
lings are so inadequate that they cannot
meaningfully challenged as factual declinations; appellant can simply argue
legal insufficiency of the findings as
tned.
infants <s=>210
Trial court's findings of fact in support
termination of noncustodial father's patal rights were inadequate, though conuting three pages of text, where most
the "findings" were conclusory and
re akin to conclusions of law, and pro»d no insight into the evidentiary basis
the trial court's decision. Rules Civ.
c, Rule 52(a).
Appeal and Error <3=4106(5)
Unless record clearly and uncontrotedly supports trial court's decision, abce of adequate findings of fact ordinariequires remand for more detailed finds by the trial court. Rules Civ.Proc,
e 52(a).
nfants <£=>254
Affirmance of noncustodial father's
sntal rights as a matter of law was
ossible, thus requiring remand where
lings of fact were inadequate, where
•e was conflicting testimony about matsuch as frequency and duration of
ler's visits with the child, his treatment
he child during those visits, and custodimother's attempts to prevent father
n visiting with the child.
)hn Walsh, Salt Lake City, for appelarry R. Keller, Salt Lake City, for apee.
efore JACKSON, ORME, and
3SON, JJ.
Such a provision is not terribly helpful to
rties, like these, whose breakup is accompaed by considerable rancor.

OPINION
ORME, Judge:
Appellant appeals the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights in his
son. Appellant challenges the juvenile
court's findings of fact insofar as they
purportedly support a determination of
abandonment. We reverse and remand for
more detailed findings.
FACTS
Appellee Kim Woodward and appellant
Richard Cameron Fazzio met in 1985 and
began living together in August of that
year. In September of 1986, Woodward
gave birth to the parties' son. Three
months later, Woodward and Fazzio participated in a marriage ceremony. However,
at the time of the ceremony Woodward was
already married to another man. As a
result, when the union between Woodward
and Fazzio was terminated, annulment was
the method employed. The decree of annulment gave Woodward custody of the
child, subject to reasonable visitation by
Fazzio "as the parties can agree." 1 After
approximately two years under this arrangement, during which time Fazzio
claims Woodward repeatedly attempted to
prevent him from contacting the child, Fazzio petitioned the district court to amend
the decree to provide for specific visitation.
Woodward responded with a petition to terminate Fazzio's parental rights and a motion to transfer the same to juvenile court
The transfer was granted, and the petition
was heard by the juvenile court in August
of 1990. The court granted Woodward's
petition, ruling Fazzio's conduct constituted
abandonment of the child. This determination was accepted by the district court.
On appeal, Fazzio challenges the correctness of four of the juvenile court's findings
of fact2 Those findings, in pertinent part,
provide:
2. Fazzio sets forth three additional issues on
appeal. These arguments are wholly without
merit and we decline to address them. See, e.g.,
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 8?6 (Utah 1989).
%
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(#7) Petitioner and Respondent separated for the last time on September 10,
1987, and Respondent has failed to make
a serious effort to see the minor child,
since that time.
It is evident to the court that the natural father has abdicated his responsibility
as a parent to said child. He has absented himself, for various and sundry reasons, from the Child's life.
His contacts with the child have been
inconsistent, sporadic and token—
[T]he father's contact with the child has
been minimal and only when his parents,
Mr. and Mrs. Richard Fazzio, the paternal grandparents, had the child.
The father testified to frequent contacts and visits with the child, usually
when in the care of the paternal grandparents, but, on more than one occasion,
the father's testimony was directly impeached rendering his testimony less reliable and trustworthy. Indeed, there is
credible and believable testimony that
the child does not know Richard Cameron Fazzio as his father.
The court is convinced that the father's
conduct has led to the destruction of the
parent/child relationship.
(# 8) During the period of the parties'
separation, and since the date of the Decree of Annulment (November 19, 1987)
Respondent has paid no child support to
Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the
minor child.
(# 10) Subsequent to the birth of the
said child, Respondent had the opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the
minor child, but he failed to do so in
order to prevent the State of Utah or
other persons or agencies from requiring
him to meet his financial obligations as a
parent
3. Under the statute, termination is permitted by
a clear and convincing showing of: (1) parental
unfitness or incompetence; (2) abandonment of
the child; (3) refusal or failure to properly care
for the child during an at-home trial period; or

(# 11) [Respondent] ... was emotionally abusive to the minor child, who is
the subject of this action.
LAW GOVERNING TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 (1987) provides the mechanism by which termination
of parental rights may be effected. Since,
in the instant case, the termination is based
solely on abandonment, we begin our
analysis by identifying the elements necessary to establish that condition.3 The statutory abandonment provision reads as follows:
(1) The court may decree a termination
of all parental rights with respect to one
or both parents if the court finds either
(a), (b), (c), or (d) as follows:
(b) that the parent or parents have abandoned the child. It is prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or
parents, although having legal custody
of the child, have surrendered physical
custody of the child, and for a period of
six months following the surrender have
not manifested to the child or to the
person having the physical custody of
the child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements for
the care of the child;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-48 (1987).
[1,2] Only for a custodial parent may a
"prima facie" showing of abandonment be
established as set forth in subsection (b).
State ex rel T.E. v. S.E., 761 P.2d 956, 958
(Utah App.1988). But abandonment by a
non-custodial parent like Fazzio, as well as
a custodial parent, "may also be found
where conduct on the part of the parent
'implies a conscious disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to the child, leading to the destruction of the parent-child
relationship.'" Id. (quoting State ex rel
(4) failure to communicate with the child for a
period of one year, without just cause. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct.
1388, 1403, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re K.S.,
737 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1987).
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nets Children v. Wulffenstein, 560
331, 334 (Utah 1977)). See State ex
R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d 1234, 1236
App.1988). The Wulffenstein test
letermining abandonment in termii proceedings requires proof of two
mts. First, the party seeking termin must prove that "the parent's conevidenced a conscious disregard for
• her parental obligations" to the child.
terly, 750 P.2d at 1236. Second, the
' must demonstrate that the "dis•d led to the destruction of the parentrelationship."4 Id; Wulffenstein,
P.2d at 334. Both of these elements
. be proven by clear and convincing
mce. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455
745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 71
.2d 599 (1982); In re J. Children, 664
1158, 1159 (Utah 1983).
FINDINGS GENERALLY
I Rule 52(a), Utah R.Civ.R, provides
"[i]n all actions tried upon the facts
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the
t shall find the facts specially and state
irately its conclusions of law there.." 5 Utah appellate courts "consisty stress" the importance of adequate
dings of fact." State v. Vigil 815 P.2d
>, 1300 (Utah App.1991). To succeed in
lenging the findings, appellant must
re they are clearly erroneous, i.e.,
inst the clear weight of the evidence.
te ex rel. J.R.T. v. Timperly, 750 P.2d
4, 1236 (Utah App.1988). Therefore, if
are to determine whether the evidence
uced at trial supports the trial court's
lings, the findings must embody suffiit detail and include enough subsidiary
ts to clearly show the evidence upon
ich they are grounded. See Acton v.
}
iran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987);
Hian v. King, 661 P.2d 953, 957 (Utah

1983); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,
1338 (Utah 1979). Absent adequate findings of fact, meaningful review of a decision's evidentiary basis is virtually impossible. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767,
771 (Utah App.1990).
Fazzio, in his brief and at oral argument,
characterized his appeal as a challenge to
the trial court's factual findings. Accordingly, he attempted to marshal the evidence, as is required for such a challenge.
See In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885,
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). However,
the marshaling effort was largely ineffectual by reason of the conclusory nature of
the trial court's findings of fact.
[4,5] "The process of marshaling the
evidence serves the important function of
reminding litigants and appellate courts of
the broad deference owed to the fact finder
at trial." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739
(Utah App.1990). However, we will only
grant this deference when the findings of
fact are sufficiently detailed to disclose the
evidentiary basis for the court's decision.
See Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 (trial court
decision afforded no deference when findings inadequate). See also Allred v.
Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App.
1990) (failure to enter detailed findings concerning child support determination constitutes abuse of trial court's discretion).
There is, in effect, no need for an appellant
to marshal the evidence when the findings
are so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully challenged as factual determinations. In other words, the way to
attack findings which appear to be complete and which are sufficiently detailed is
to marshal the supporting evidence and
then demonstrate the evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings. But where
the findings are not of that caliber, appel-

presumption against termination will govern.
Concern for the child's best interest is maniSee In re J.R, 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1982);
sted in the second prong of the Wulffenstein
In re Castillo, 632 P.2d 855, 856-57 (Utah 1981);
bandonment test: there is a strong presumpState ex rel M.W.H. v. Aguilar, 794 P.2d 27, 29
on that a child is better off in the care of its
(Utah App.1990).
atural parents, or at least having some relaonship with its natural parents, and absent
lear and convincing evidence that the parent's 5. The rule is applicable to juvenile proceedings.
See In re N.H.B., 111 P.2d 487, 493 (Utah App.),
disregard for his or her obligations caused a
cert denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
destruction of the parent-child relationship, the
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lant need not go through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather, appellant can simply
argue the legal insufficiency of the court's
findings as framed. As explained in the
next section, whatever may be said of the
extent to which the trial court's intended
findings lack evidentiary support, the more
immediate problem in this case is the inadequacy of the findings.
INADEQUACY OF TRIAL COURTS
FINDINGS OF FACT
[6] Although the trial court's findings
of fact constitute a full three pages of text,
they nonetheless provide an inadequate account of the actual facts supporting the
court's ultimate decision. Most of the
"findings" are conclusory, and reflect an
intention to merge the trial court's ultimate
factual determinations with the requirements of the Wulffenstein test, and as
such are more akin to conclusions of law.
See Vigil, 815 P.2d at 1299-1301. Finding
of Fact # 7, for instance, states that "[appellant's] contacts with the child have been
inconsistent, sporadic and token," that "it
is evident to the court that the natural
Father has abdicated his responsibility as a
parent," and that "the court is convinced
that the father's conduct has led to the
destruction of the parent/child relationship." These conclusory statements provide no insight into the evidentiary basis
for the trial court's decision and render
effective appellate review unfeasible.6 See
Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 5-6
(Utah Ct.App.1991). The issue before the
court was whether Fazzio had abandoned
R.A.F.; accordingly, the findings should
have set forth specific facts—subsidiary
facts—bearing on that issue. The conclusory statements in Findings of Fact # 7, 8,
6. Taking, for example, the court's statement that
appellant's contacts with the child have been
"token," the court obviously had in mind some
number or range of contacts appellant had with
the child. But such a finding is problematic.
Does the court have in mind one contact over a
three-year period or ten contacts over a oneyear period? A reviewing court would possibly
agree that the former is "token," but disagree
that the latter is. However, without knowing
what the trial court had in mind, to affirm

10, and 11 do not provide this information
and are therefore inadequate.
[7] Unless the record "clearly and uncontrovertedly supports]" the trial court's
decision, the absence of adequate finding?
of fact ordinarily requires remand for more
detailed findings by the trial court.7 Acton, 737 P.2d at 999. See also Lovegren.
798 P.2d at 770-71 (remand necessary
when facts disputed). But see State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n. 6 (Utah
1991) (suggesting same liberalization of Acton 's requirement of express findings ever,
absent uncontroverted evidence).
[8] We have canvassed the record in
the instant case and find disputed evidence,
making affirmance as a matter of law impossible. Cf Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.
10 (absence of adequate findings is harmless when facts concerning an issue are
undisputed). There was conflicting testimony about the frequency and duration o:
Fazzio's visits with the child, his treatment
of the child during those visits, Woodward's attempts to prevent Fazzio from
visiting with the child, Fazzio's payment or
child support, and Fazzio's provision or
gifts to the child—all facts crucial to the
validity of the court's ultimate decision that
Fazzio's conduct had destroyed the parent
child relationship. See Adams, 821 P.2d at
6 ("When multiple conflicting versions of
the facts create a matrix of possible factual
findings, we are unable on appeal to assume that any given finding was in fact
made.").
The trial court's findings of fact should
resolve these conflicts unequivocally, by
stating the specific subsidiary facts as the
trial court found them. The finding?
should set forth, with as much precision as
possible, the number of times Fazzio visiteu
the child during particular periods; the
would be to defer to the court's legal conclusion.
as though a matter of fact, without being able tc
evaluate its correctness against particular facts
7. Otherwise, this court would be placed in the
awkward position of having to speculate abou:
what the court actually determined the facts to
be, without benefit of the guidance that proper
factual findings are meant to provide.
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of each of the visits; the number of
Woodward intentionally prevented;
ms Fazzio provided as child support,
personally or through his parents;
mber and type of gifts Fazzio gave
child and the occasions on which he
them; and the specific statements,
>r omissions that demonstrate Fazitent to either accept or disregard his
-ions as a parent (e.g., instances of
int performing child care functions
langing his diaper or feeding him,
g that the child was his responsibili.).
iier, the findings should explicitly
s the impact Woodward's frequent
;ion had on Fazzio's ability to mainintact with the child,8 the effect Faziving and working outside Utah had
visitation,9 the manner and effect of
ifusal on Fazzio's part to legally ac3dge his paternity, and any other
3 bearing on whether Fazzio conly disregarded the child to such an
that the parent-child relationship
jstroyed.10 The court's findings as to
issues should be set forth specifically
hould correspond to the factual eviupon which the court relied.
e we possess this information, we can
ngfully evaluate whether the visits
>een sporadic, the child support payinsufficient, Fazzio's conduct unac>le, and, ultimately, whether Fazzio
oned the child. Accordingly, we r e
for more detailed findings by the
ourt
i do not intend our remand to be
y an exercise in bolstering and supg the conclusion already reached."
* v. Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah
This court is not altogether confihat the trial court's final decision was
i record indicates that from the time the
ee of annulment was entered until trial,
dward had moved in with her mother, then
her own apartment, then to Coalville,
igville, Riverton, West Jordan, and back to
ville.
e record indicates Fazzio was employed in
ming and Nevada for periods of time after
decree was entered and maintained resit s in those states.
'.26-12

correct, particularly since the action to terminate Fazzio's parental rights was commenced by Woodward in response to Fazzio's petition for specific visitation. The
timely assertion of such a petition by Fazzio is hardly the conduct of a disinterested
parent
JACKSON, J., concurs.
RUSSON, J., concurs in the result
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LeBARON & ASSOCIATES,
INC., Plaintiff,
v.
REBEL ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
NEC INFORMATION SYSTEMS,
INC., Third-Party Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 910120-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 18, 1991.
Manufacturer, by third-party counterclaim, asserted contract action to recover
from dealer money allegedly owed under
authorized dealer agreement. Judgment
for manufacturer was entered by the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth
Rigtrup, J., and dealer appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate PJ.,
10. For example, the court seems to have discounted visits Fazzio had with his son while the
son was in the company of Fazzio's parents.
Especially given the animosity between Woodward and Fazzio, and Woodward's apparent
preference for dealing with Fazzio's parents, no
reason immediately suggests itself for why Fazzio's visits with the child during time the child
spent with his paternal grandparents should not
"count" in Fazzio's favor.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT >»cr-~
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STATE OF UTAH, in the Interest:
of

Case No.: 786412

FAZZIO, RICHARD ANTHONY
(09/17/86)

WOODWARD, KIM (FAZZIO)

JUN 1 5 1992

- Petitioner

vs.
FAZZIO, RICHARD CAMERON - Respondent

ORDER
:

DISTRICT COURT
Case No: 87-37986

:

Upon remand from the Utah Court of Appeals this Court submits the
following supplemental and amended detailed findings in support of its order
entered on November 28, 1990.
Paragraph 7. Although there was disputed evidence admitted during the
course of the trial, the Court finds the following facts by clear and
convincing evidence to be believable:
a. Respondent admitted that he urged Petitioner to get an abortion
when he first learned she was pregnant with R.A.F.. Respondent urged
Petitioner to get an abortion on more than one occasion;
b. Respondent did not actively participate in the parenting of R.A.F.
from the time he was born. He refused to babysit the child, even though
he was not working most of the time during the parties 1 marriage.
Respondent would not get up at night with the child, would not change a
diaper, and would not bottle feed the child;
c. Respondent refused to take financial responsibility for R.A.F.,
during the course of the marriage and never gave her any money for the
child, except as mentioned in paragraph (m);
d. After the parties separated for the last time, Petitioner spoke to
Respondent many times about needing money and child support, and he
refused to give her any child support;
e. On one occasion. Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had
her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she
started calling for Christopher (her son from a prior marriage) to run
over to the neighbors and have them call the police. As soon as he
moved. Respondent said'(I)f anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill
her.1 R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing
this physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Both
R.A.F. and Christopher were terrified and they were taken to the police
to the YWCA after this incident;
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f. Petitioner received no child support from Respondent and she tried
constantly to locate him, but was unable. Even though Respondent's
parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, lived at the same address during
this entire period of time, they would refuse to tell her Respondent's
address. When Petitioner saw Respondent, she asked him for child
support and he refused to give it to her;
g. Although Respondent came around four or five times from the date of
their separation in September of 1987, through September of 1988, he
spent very little time with R.A.F.. After September of 1988,
Respondent never came to see the child nor telephone, nor contacted the
child;
h. Petitioner would allow respondent's parents, Richard and Steffany
Fazzio, to see the child occasionally between September of 1988 and
October of 1989, as they requested. However, after the visitations
with Respondent's parents, Petitioner would always ask R.A.F., if he
had seen Respondent during the visitations, and R.A.F., would say "no";
i. Although Richard and Steffany Fazzio, the paternal grandparents,
testified that they visited with the child on occasion between
September of 1988 and October 1989, and although the paternal
grandparents claimed that Respondent was present during some of these
grandparent visitation periods, the father's testimony in this regard
was directly impeached and the Court finds his testimony unreliable/
untrustworthy and unbelievable;
j. The grandparents' testimony in regard to their son's visitations
seemed unreliable and unbelievable in light of their own great interest
in maintaining contact with R.A.F., and in light of the fact that their
testimony was impeached on several occasions. For instance, the
grandparents' willingness to exaggerate the truth regarding their son's
contact with the child was shown by their testimony regarding the
court-ordered visitation occurring between March and the time of the
trial in the instant case in August 1990. While suggesting that
Petitioner was hard to find, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that Petitioner
brought the child to her and her husband for visitation for
approximately one year. Furthermore, Mrs. Fazzio admitted on
cross-examination that she really did not know when Respondent did or
did not see R.A.F.. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she and her husband were
paying the attorney's fees for the instant action and not Respondent;
k. Although Mrs. Fazzio testified that she and her husband had
submitted child support payments to Petitioner once this termination
action was filed, she claims it was on behalf of Respondent; however,
she admitted Respondent only reimbursed her for three of the nine
checks she claimed to have sent to Petitioner. Furthermore, Mrs.
Fazzio admitted that no offers were made to pay the child support to
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Petitioner until this termination action was filed on January 26, 1990/
by Petitioner;
1. Mrs. Fazzio did testify that some toys were purchased for the child
by Respondent, but in light of the fact she testified her son did not
pay child support because he had been unemployed and his earnings were
low, her testimony was unreliable and the Court believes it was the
paternal grandparents who were thoughtful enough to purchase the few
toys in question for R.A.F.;
m. Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she never concerned herself with whether
or not Petitioner had enough money to meet: the basic needs of R.A.F.,
her grandson. Mrs. Fazzio suggested this was because she felt it was
*a matter between Kim and Cameron.... (A)nd I did not know he was not
providing for her. I had no need to do (sic know) that.1 Despite this
testimony, on at least two different occasions during Petitioner's
attorney's cross-examination of her, Mrs. Fazzio admitted that she knew
Respondent was not paying child support to Petitioner, making her
testimony less credible;
n. Further testimony showing the unreliability and unbelievability of
the testimony of the paternal grandparents came during
cross-examination involving court-ordered visitation commenced in June
of 1990, after the instant actions were filed. Mrs. Fazzio admitted
that she was aware that visitation with R.A.F. was to be at her
residence by court order. Upon cross-examination, she admitted that on
one occasion she and her husband left Salt Lake City with a boat
attached to their truck, but dropped off the boat prior to picking up
R.A.F. at Petitioner's residence. She admitted that after picking up
R.A.F., she and her husband went back and picked up the boat and went
boating on Echo Reservoir with R.A.F., Mrs. Fazzio stated that her boat
was her home and so she didn't feel that she and her husband were
violating Commissioner Peuler's (and Judge Wilkinson's) Order that
visitation be at their residence. She indicated that '. • • summer
weekends, our boat is our home. • • It's an overnight boat, it has
cooking and sleeping facilities, and we live in it weekends. ' However,
when Mrs. Fazzio was asked how many weekends they had slept overnight
on the boat that year, 1990, through August 17 (the day of the trial),
she admitted that they had not slept on the boat once that year);
o.
Richard Bruce Fazzio, the paternal grandfather, agreed with his
wife that his boat was his personal residence and their exercising
visitation in June of 1990, by taking the child boating rather than to
their home in Salt Lake City was not a violation of the District
Court's Order. Such testimony shows the incredulity and
unbelievability of the paternal grandparents, Steffany Fazzio and
Richard Bruce Fazzio;
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p. Petitioner gave Respondent's parents a note in October of 1989,
indicating that she was going on vacation and she would allow them to
see the child later. It was immediately after receiving this note at a
time of expected visitation, that Mr. and Mrs. Fazzio retained an
attorney and filed the Petition for Modification on behalf of their
son, the Respondent. The Court believes that the instant action was
filed only as a response to Responsent' s parents' concern about their
own visitation with the child, and not their son's;
g. R.A.F. believes his dad is Petitioner's present husband, Mark
Woodward (T. 83). He simply did not know who his biological father was
as a result of his biological father's failure to make any serious
efforts to visit with him;
r. Petitioner allowed court-ordered visitation when requested between
March of 1990 and the time of trial in this matter (August 1990),
although there were only three occasions when Respondent took advantage
of the opportunity to visit the child during this period of time.
After one of these visitations, R.A.F. exclaimed to Petitioner 'Mom,
Cameron told me he's my dad. He's not my dad.' On another occasion
after a court-ordered visitation, R.A.F. was asked by Petitioner who
Cameron (Respondent) was, and he would say that he was Brian's brother;
and when asked by Petitioner who his dad was, he would always say
'Mark' (R.A.F.'s stepfather);
s. Witnesses Barbara Kresser and Ken Kresser, the parents of R.A.F.'s
stepfather, Mark Woodward, testified that R.A.F. has never mentioned
Respondent or anything about his natural father, and that contrary to
the claims of the Respondent, R.A.F. has not been taught anything by
the family with regard to who his father is, that it is just a natural
relationship and a happy family;
t. The Court finds that rather than Petitioner's movements from
different residences being the cause of Respondent's failure to visit
with the child. Respondent failed to have contact with the child to
avoid paying child support. On one occasion, Christy Tinnin,
Petitioner's sister, testified she accidentally ran into Respondent at
a truck stop in February of 1989, at a time when she was aware
Petitioner was looking for him to get him to pay child support.
Respondent said to Ms. Tinnin during that conversation '• • . do me a
favor and don't tell Kim you saw me, because I am supposed to be in
Nevada.';
u. Even though Respondent was provided with court-ordered visitation
after the filing of the instant lawsuit, he did not make an effort to
spend much time with the child during the court-ordered visitations.
Ken Kresser, the husband of Barbara Kresser and step-father of Mark
Woodward and Petitioner's present husband, testified that after the May
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1990, court-ordered visitation with Respondent, he asked R.A.F. about
the visitation. R.A.F. replied that he had gone to the park. When Mr.
Kresser asked him if Cameron (Respondent:) was there with him, R.A.F.
stated 'no, he was sleeping.';
Paragraph 8. During the period of the parties' separation, and since
the date of the Decree of Annulment (November 19, 1987), Respondent has paid
no child support to Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the minor child.
Richard Anthony Fazzio.
a. The testimony was clear at the trial that Respondent owed to
Petitioner some $3,000.00 in back child support at the time of trial in
this matter;
b. Petitioner made significant efforts to contact Respondent to get
him to pay child support and was regularly informed by Respondent's
parents, Richard and Steffany Fazzio, that they did not know how to
contact Respondent and could not give her an address or telephone
number for him. This Court finds it unbelievable that Mr. and Mrs.
Fazzio never knew where their son was so as to allow Petitioner to
contact him for purposes of obtaining her court-ordered child support;
c. Only after Petitioner filed her Petition for Termination of
Parental Rights did she receive any checks from anyone regarding child
support. She did receive certain checks from the grandparents, Richard
and Steffany Fazzio, at that time, supposedly on behalf of Respondent,
but her attorney advised her to return those checks. The evidence is
uncontroverted that no monies were ever submitted to Petitioner on a
checking account with Respondent's on a checking account with
Respondent's name on it. Nor was there any evidence that Respondent
had provided any money to Petitioner;
d. Respondent's testimony regarding efforts to pay child support was
inherently unbelievable, untrustworthy and unreliable. Examples from
the record are follows:
1. Respondent claimed to have provided a car worth $600.00 to
Petitioner in lieu of two months child support. However,
rebuttal witness Scott Ortar testified that in fact Respondent
sold the car in question to Sommers Auto Wrecking approximately
three months after the parties' marriage was annulled for
$75.00. Respondent admitted on cross-examination that he indeed
sold the very same vehicle he claimed to have given Petitioner in
lieu of child support to Sommers Auto Wrecking for $75.00, and
further admitted that he did not give the $75.00 to Petitioner;
2. Related to, but in addition to the foregoing regarding the
car, Respondent testified on direct examination he did not give
Petitioner title to the 1979 Mercury he was providing her in lieu

AMENDED FIWDiwuo uc *«%.*
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of child support after the annulment, because he did not have the
title. Despite this testimony by Respondent, Petitioner
introduced at trial Exhibit 7 which is a Utah Certificate of
Title to the 1979 Mercury in question and related documents.
This exhibit showed that the Utah Certificate of Title was issued
in the name of Respondent, and was never in the name of
Petitioner. Furthermore, this exhibit showed that Respondent
signed the document as "transferor" before a notary public on
February 5, 1988. This was the very date of the check introduced
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 made out to Respondent from Sommers Auto
Wrecking. Moreover, the VIN number of the vehicle on the
Certificate of Title and the check made out to Richard D. Fazzio
from Sommers Auto Wrecking are exactly the same, and clearly
establish that this was the same vehicle Respondent claimed to
have given Petitioner in lieu of child support. When confronted
with the title to the car and the check from Sommers wrecking on
cross-examination by Petitioner's attorney, Respondent testified
he wished to change his testimony about not having the title to
the vehicle and giving it to Petitioner in lieu of child support;
3. Pursuant to the Decree of Annulment issued by the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson in Civil No D-87-3798 on November 19, 1987,
Petitioner alone was entitled to claim R.A.F. as a dependent on
her income tax return;
4. Although Respondent had stated on cross-examination that he
had always been truthful with government agencies, Petitioner's
attorney on cross-examination showed Respondent Exhibit 8 which
is Respondent's 1987 Tax Return. Petitioner's attorney asked
Respondent if everything reported on his 1987 Tax return was
true, and Respondent replied it was. Yet he claimed R.A.F. as a
deduction in violation of the Decree of Annulment despite his
failure to pay child support;
5. On cross-examination. Respondent was shown Petitioner's
Exhibit 9 which was Respondent's 1988 Income Tax Return.
Respondent admitted he paid no child support for 1988, but that
the tax return showed that he was claiming R.A.F. as a dependent
stating to the IRS that R.A.F. had lived in Respondent's home six
months during 1988. Respondent admitted that that was not true
and that he had apparently made a mistake in believing that his
son, R.A.F., had lived in his home for six months in 1988 when he
was living in Wyoming, Nevada and with his grandmother in Salt
Lake City;
6. The false statements made to the federal government on the
income tax return claiming R.A.F. as a dependent under
circumstances where he did not pay child support made
Respondent's testimony incredible and unbelievable.
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Paragraph 10. Subsequent to the birth of said child. Respondent had
the opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the minor child, but he
failed to do so in order to prevent the State of Utah or other persons or
agencies from requiring him to meet his financial obligations as a parent.
a. Darren Holt, Petitioner's husband from a prior marriage, and the
father of Petitioner's child Darren Christopher Holt, received notice
in approximately December of 1986 from the Department of Recovery
Services stating he was responsible for child support for R.A.F.. Mr.
Holt
testified that he approched Respondent numerous times regarding this
situation and asked him to submit to tests or sign a legal document
admitting to the paternity of R.A.F. Respondent steadfastly refused to
ever sign a document with the Department of Recovery Services
acknowledging his paternity of R.A.F.. Mr. Holt contacted Respondent
some 14 or 15 times attempting to get him to admit to his paternity of
R.A.F. with the State and Respondent consistently refused;
b. Although Respondent claimed he had signed a document upon the birth
of R.A.F. acknowledging paternity, Respondent was unable to provide a
copy of any document, or even an identification of a document he had
signed acknowledging paternity when challenged to do so at trial by
Petitioner's counsel. The result of Respondent's failure to
acknowledge the paternity of R.A.F. to the State of Utah was that
Darren Holt paid child support to the State of Utah's Department of
Recovery Services on behalf of R.A.F., an obligation that was
rightfully that of the Respondent.
Paragraph 11. Although neither dispositive nor controlling in this
case, there is evidence that during the period of time that Petitioner and
Respondent lived together, Respondent was abusive, physically and emotionally
to Petitioner, to Petitioner's minor child from a former marriage, and was
emotionally abusive to the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio, who is the
subject of this action.
a. Petitioner had a child from a previous marriage, Darren Christopher
Holt (DOB: 2/13/83), who lived with Petitioner at the time she was
married to Respondent. Christopher was approximately four years old
during that period;
b. During the course of the marriage. Petitioner and her children,
including R.A.F., were regularly subjected to mental and physical
threats and abuse by Respondent;
c. Respondent admitted during the course of the marriage that he
"smacked Kim" and that he did not make sure that either R.A.F. or the
child Christopher were out of the room when he slapped her;
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d. Petitioner talked Respondent into seeking marriage counseling
during the marriage; but not only did his abuse of her not change,
Respondent actually beat her the day of counseling because he didn't
like the things she said to the counselor;
e. Darren Holt testified that his son, Christopher, told him during
his visitations that he was terrified of Respondent, and that
Respondent had threatened him (Christopher) with a knife and hit him a
number of times. Mr. Holt also testified Christopher told him
Respondent at one point drove Petitioner and Christopher out of
Petitioner's horn* with a gun and told them that if they came back, he
(Respondent) would kill them. This testimony was corroborated by
Petitioner;
f. When Mr. Holt confronted Respondent about this abuse of his son,
Christopher, Respondent replied". . . While Christopher is in my house,
I will treat him the way I want." this testimony was corroborated by
Petitioner who described respondent's attitude toward Christopher as
"mean and hateful . . . cruel. . .;
g. On one occasion. Respondent grabbed Petitioner by the hair and had
her on the floor and was beating her head into the floor when she
started calling for Christopher to run over to the neighbors and have
them call the police. Petitioner testified that as Christopher moved,
Respondent said M(I)if anybody moves off that couch, I'll kill her."
R.A.F. was one of the two children present on the couch observing this
physical abuse to his mother and the threat to kill her. Both R.A.F.
and Christopher were terrified and they were taken by the police to the
YWCA after this incident.
Dated this 15th day of June, 1992.
BY THE COURT

cc: Sf&c. Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
•Mr'. John Walsh, Esq.
3865 South Wasatch Blvd.
Suite 202 - Cove Point Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
xtftah Court of Appeals
No. 900626CA
10:111
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ELLIOTT LEVINE, USB#1939
Attorney for Plaintiff
4168 South 1785 West
West Valley City, Utah 8411906
Telephone: 966-3502

Cte^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KIM FAZZIO,
DECREE OF ANNULMENT

Plaintiff
RICHARD CAMERON FAZZIO,

Civil No. D-87-3798
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendant.

The above action came on for hearing before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge, on Friday, November
13, 1987. The Plaintiff appeared with her counsel, Elliott
Levine. The Defendant

appeared in person without counsel.

Defendant filed his Acknowledgement that he had been served with
a copy of the Complaint and waived service of process; said
Defendant also consented that default may be entered against him
.andfoiEhafci^thla^jna11eT.^may1Tt^e_^theard_on_tfre

Comp 1 aint of the

Plaintiff" without further.notice.to, Defendant.
Upon entry of the default of the Defendant and the
taking of the proofs of the Plaintiff and made its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully advised in the
premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1. That the marriage ceremony entered into between the
parties on November 3 , 1986, is hereby, declared to be null and
void and of no force or effect.
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Plaintiff is awarded of the minor child of the

parties, RICHARD ANTHONY, subject to reasonable visitation rights
in the Defendant as agreed upon between the parties* Defendant is
ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month as
and for child support until said
majority.

child reaches the age of

Defendant is ordered to maintain his existing medical

and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor child of the
parties.

Each party is ordered to assume and pay one half (1/2)

of any medical or dental costs of the minor child not covered by
insurance. Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the minor child
of the parties as a dependant on her income tax returns.
3. The marital property is awarded to the party having
possession of the same.
4. The parties are ordered to assume and pay all
marital debts pursuant to agreement. Each party is ordered to
assume and pay any debts or obligations incurred by themselves
after

the filing of this action, and hold the other party

harmless therefrom.
5. No alimony is awarded to either party.
6.

Defendant is ordered to maintain Plaintiff and her

minor children by a prior marriage on his existing medical
insurance until Plaintiff remarries.
7*

The Court hereby authories the withholding of

income as a means of collecting any child support ordered by the
Court in this Decree. It is further ordered that when child
support is delinquent, as defined by Subsection 78-45d-l(4), Utah
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APPENDIX 5

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
FAZZIO, KIM
PLAINTIFF
VS
FAZZIO, RICHARD CAMERON
DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

CASE NUMBER 874903798 DA
DATE 02/03/90
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER
COURT REPORTER WRITTEN NO TAPE
COURT CLERK SPO

MOTION HEARING

P. ATTY. KELLER, LARRY R.
D. ATTY. WALSH, JOHN

ON MOTION OF
PLTF & DEFT

COMM. RECOMMENDS:
1. THAT PLTF'S MOTION TO TRANSFER THE ISSUE OF VISITATION TO
JUVENILE COURT BE DENIED.
2. THAT ON A TEMPORARY BASIS, DEFT'S REASONABLE VISITATION BE
DEFINED AS FOLLOWS: ONE WEEKEND PER MONTH, SATURDAY 10:00
A.M. - 5 P.M. AND SUNDAY 10:00 A.M. - 5 P.M., TO BE
EXERCISED AT DEFT'S PARENT'S RESIDENCE. FURTHER, THAT
DEFT BE RESPONSIBLE TO TRANSPORT THE CHILD FOR VISITATION.
THIS VISITATION IS TO BE EXERCISED ONLY WHEN THE DEFT IS
IN SALT LAKE, AND UNLESS THE PARTIES AGREE OTHERWISE, IS
TO BE THE THIRD WEEKEND OF EACH MONTH, BEGINNING IN
FEBRUARY, 1990. DEFT IS TO PROVIDE 1 WEEK ADVANCE NOTICE OF
HIS INTENT TO VISIT.
3. THAT BOTH PARTIES BE PERMANENTLY ENJOINED, PERSONALLY
OR THROUGH AGENTS, FROM HARASSING, ANNOYING, OR THREATENING
THE OTHER.
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APPENDIX 6

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEREST OF

FAZZIO, RICHARD ANTHONY
DOB: September 17, 1986

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND DECREE

:
:
:

CASE NO.

:

Judge Olof A. Johansson

786412

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for trial on August 16,
17, and 28, 1990, with Petitioner Kim Woodward being present and represented
by her attorney, Larry R. Keller, Esq., and Respondent Richard Cameron
Fazzio being present and represented by his attorney, John Walsh, Esq.

The

Court, after receiving evidence from the parties and their witnesses,
hearing arguments of counsel and reviewing the exhibits and such memoranda
of counsel as submitted, and good cause appearing herein enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner Kim (Fazzio) Woodward and the minor child, Richard

Anthony Fazzio, the subject of this action, are residents of Summit County,
State of Utah.
2.

Respondent Richard Cameron Fazzio is a resident of Clark County,

State of Nevada.
3.

Petitioner and Respondent were married on November 3, 1986.

4.

Subsequent to the marriage, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson of the

Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
issued a Decree of Annulment of said marriage dated November 19, 1987.
5.

As a result of the union of Petitioner and Respondent, a single

child was born, Richard Anthony Fazzio, date of birth, September 17, 1986.

-2-

6.

Petitioner has subsequently remarried, and Petitioner's name is r.c

Kim Woodward.
7.

Petitioner and Respondent separated for the last time on

approximately September 10, 1987, and Respondent has failed to make a
serious effort to see the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio since that
time.
It is evident to the Court that the natural father has abdicated his
responsibility as a parent to said child.

He has absented himself, for

various and sundry reasons, from this child's life.
His contacts with the child have been inconsistent, sporadic and token.
Except for time periods early in the child's life, the father's contact wit
the child has been minimal and only when his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Richard
Fazzio, the paternal grandparents, had the child.
relationship of convenience for the father.

It appears to be a

The Court has observed no firn:

intent or manifestation from the conduct of the father that he was serious
about establishing a meaningful parent/child relationship or to resume care
of the child.
The father testified to frequent contacts and visits with the cild,
usually when in the care of the paternal grandparents, but, on more than cm
occasion, the father's testimony was directly impeached rendering his
testimony less reliable and trustworthy.

Indeed, there is credible and

believable testimony that the child does not know Richard Cameron Fazzio as
his father.

-3-

The record reflects significant investment of time, love, inceresc, and
concern for the child by the paternal grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. Richard
Fazzio.

But their altruistic efforts cannot be ascribed to the father, as

the Court must look to the father's conduct alone in reaching its judgment.
The Court is rnTyirfti<y_4 tj\4C ^

a

f^Ch*r'<? conduct has led to the destruction

of the parent/child relationship.
8.

During the period of the parties' separation, and since the date of

the Decree of Annulment (November 19, 1987), Respondent has paid no child
support to Petitioner or anyone else on behalf of the minor child, Richard
AntKohy Fazzio.
9.

Petitioner attempted to locate and contact Respondent since the data

of the parties' annulment so that she might collect child support, but she
was unsuccessful in locating him.
10.

Subsequent to the birth of said child, Respondent had the

opportunity to legally declare his paternity for the minor child, but he
failed to do so in order to prevent the State of Utah or otiier persons or
agencies from requiring him to meet his financial obligations as a parent.
11.

Although neither dispositive nor controlling in this case, there is

evidence that during the period of time that Petitioner and Respondent lived
together, Respondent was abusive, physically and emotionally to Petitioner,
to Petitioner's minor child from a former marriage, and was emotionally
abusive to the minor child, Richard Anthony Fazzio, who is the subject of
this action.
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Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV
1.

Respondent Richard Cameron Fazzio's overall conduct constitutes a

"conscious disregard" of the parental obligation to the child,
2.

Such "conscious disregard" of the parental obligation to the child

has led to the destruction of the parent-child relationship between
Respondent and the minor child.
3.

Therefore, the -linor child has been abandoned by his natural father

within the purview of the requirements of U.C.A. 78-3a-48 of the Juvenile
Court Act, and subsequent Utah Supreme Court and Appellate Court decisions
interpreting said statute.
4.

The trial held in this case met the requirements of U.C.A.

78-3a-48(2) as a "hearing held specifically on the question of terminating
the rights of the parent," Richard Cameron Fazzio.
5.

Richard Cameron Fazzio was properly represented by competent legal

counsel and present during all proceedings conducted herein.
In viewing the totality of the circumstances, and based upon the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, a careful review of the evidence,
the exhibits and the arguments of Counsel, the Court is convinced by clear
and convincing evidence that said child has been legally abandoned by his
father, and therefore, enters the following decree:

-5-

DECREE
1.

It is hereby Ordered that the parental rights of Richard Cameron

Fazzio, as to said minor child, are hereby permanently terminated including
any and all residual parental rights,
2.

The decision of this Court does not rest upon U.C.A. 78-30-5, as

this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under that
Section.
3.

It is further directed that Mr. Larry Keller, counsel for

Petitioner, file a certified copy of this Order and the Interim Order of
October 1, 1990 with the District Court in Case No. 874903798DA, Kira Fazzio
v. Richard Cameron Fazzio.

BY THE COURT,

HOI^kABLE/OL0# A. JOHANSSON
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JOHN WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW #3371
2319 SOUTH FOOTHILL DRIVE
SUITE 270
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
84109
Telet)hont: (801)467-9700

C-;LTL.
by.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
KI?i (FAZZIO) WOODWARD,
O R D E R

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 87-3798

RICHARD CAMERON FAZZIO

Judge Homer Wilkinson

Defendant.
ooooOoooo

The Intervenors, Richard Bruce Fazzio and Steffany J.
Fazzio, Ilotion for Temporary Order re: Visitation, came on
regularly for hearing before the Honorable Michael Evans,
Domestic Relations Commissioner, on Tuesday, September 10,
1991,

at the hour of 2:00 P.M., with the Plaintiff Kim Fazzio

Woodward appearing and represented by Larry R. Keller, Attorney
at Law, and the Intervenors, Richard Bruce Fazzio, and Steffany
J. Fazzio, appearing and represented by John Walsh, Attorney

at Law, and the Court after reviewing the file, the affidavits,
exhibits, etc., and being fully advised as to the facts and
circumstances, and then after hearing argument of Counsel on
all the following issues, anci otherwise for good cause anpearing,
it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, as follows:
1.

That there is no legal basis to conclude that the

rights of the Grandparents to visit the subject child and to
otherwise have a meaningful relationship with the subject
child, arei foreclosed by virtue of the fact that the Juvenile
Court has entered an order terminating the parental right of
Richard Cameron Fazzio.
2.

That as a matter of law, the Grandparents are

entitled to liberal and meaningful visitation with the minor
child as is in the best interest of the minor child,
3.

That the Juvenile Court made a specific finding

regarding the Paternal Grandparents of a minor child, Interveners
herein, as follows:

,?

The record reflects significant invest-

ment of time, love, interest, and concern for the child by the
paternal grandparents, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Fazzio.M
4.

That it is in the best interest of the minor child

that the Intervenors be granted liberal and meaningful visitation on a temporary basis as follows with no restriction as to
where the said visitation is to occur:
a. Saturday, September 2S, 1991, from the hours
of 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M.

b. Saturday and Sunday, October 5 and October 6, 1991,
from the hours! of 9:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. each day.
c. Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, October 18 through
October 20, 1991, from Friday at 6:00 P.M. to and including
Sunday at 6:00 P.M. and every third weekend of each month
thereafter.
The picking up and delivering back of the minor
child shall occur as the parties can resolve amongst themselves.
That the foregoing is a Temporary Order, until the
relationship with the minor child has been re-established.
5.

The Plaintiff's Motion for a Change of Venue is

hereby denied.
6.

The Plaintiff's Motion to Certify this matter to

the Juvenile Court is hereby denied.
7.

The Plaintiff's Motion for child support is hereby

denied, as there is no legal basis to require grandparents to
pay child support or grandchild support.
8.

On a temporary basis, Intervenors, until further

order of this court, shall not allow visitation between the
Defendant, Richard Cameron Fazzio, and the minor child, Richard
Anthony fazzio, born September 17, 1986.
Each side is to bear their own costs and attorneys fees
associated with this action.

<;*i^~

Dated t h i s / * /

dayy of 044
October, 1991
BY THE COURT:

I CERTIFY THAT THIS 08 A TRUE CO
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT fin ^L2 -N
DISTRICT COURT.3AtTlAK2CaWTV
UTAH.

DATE

DOMESTIC RELATIONS COIMISSIONE

&%t-¥j
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF >1AILING
I hereby c e r t i f y that I caused to be mailed a true and
c o r r e c t copy of the foregoing ORDER to the P l a i n t i f f , by m a i l i n g
the same, postage prepaid, addressed t o :

LARRY R. KELLER,

ATTORNEY AT LAW, 257 TOWER SUITE 340, 257 EAST 200 SOUTH - 10,
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 84111.
Dated t h i s / / j _ a a y of October, 1991.

JOHN/WALSH
ATTORNEY AT LAW

APPENDIX 8

I've been meaning to say this for a long time but after
yesterday's experience I think it is best that I don't bring Tony
down until Mark comes back to town. I feel this way for several
reasons. The first being, the way you treat me as a person. You
act like I owe you the visits to Tony. Dick especially doesn't
miss a chance to yell and this intimidates me and brings back the
same feelings of fear that Cameron used to cause me. I don't
deserve this. I have been a good mother and you don't have any
right to treat me this way.
Secondly: the way Michelle was treated. She was an innocent
person trying to do you a favor and you treated her very
harshly. It makes me mad to hear that Dick said " She (meaning
me) always does this and she should get her act together" because
I have always bent over backwards to let you see Tony. Even my
own parents did not have him over the weekend every other week
nor do your parents get your kids every other week. I am not
responsible to take Chris to Darren's parents nor am I
responsible to take Tony to Cameron's parents.
I have been doing this for you out of kindness because I realize
Cameron didn't bring him over.
Thirdly: I don't
what I am doing.
while back that I
you don't need to

like the way you question other people about
It is none of your business. I told you a
would let you see Tony when I was in town and
hassel my family and friends.

As you know, I am leaving soon and I am not sure when I will be
back but when both Mark and I are back we will bring Tony to see
you.

